BYU Law Review
Volume 2011 | Issue 2

Article 3

5-1-2011

Separation of Bank and State: Consolidating
Bailed-Out Companies into the U.S. Debt Ceiling
and Government Financial Statements
J. W. Verret

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Business Organizations Law Commons
Recommended Citation
J. W. Verret, Separation of Bank and State: Consolidating Bailed-Out Companies into the U.S. Debt Ceiling and Government Financial
Statements, 2011 BYU L. Rev. 391 (2011).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2011/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

DO NOT DELETE

5/3/2011 12:45 PM

Separation of Bank and State: Consolidating BailedOut Companies into the U.S. Debt Ceiling and
Government Financial Statements
J.W. Verret
ABSTRACT
Existing legal and economic theory presumes a clear line between
private firms and government regulating agencies. It generally assumes
that corporations maximize profit in the factor markets and
government regulators alleviate externalities in those markets. The
circumstances of the financial crisis of 2008 have altered this existing
dynamic. As a result of the bailout, the government now holds a
controlling equity interest in many of the nation’s largest financial and
automotive companies. As a prime example, the government owns a
34% voting, and thereby effectively controlling, equity interest in
Citigroup, the nation’s largest bank.
This Article examines economic theory and evidence of government
ownership in private firms and finds that government ownership and
control correlates with overwhelming costs to firm efficiency as
governments push the firms they control to subsidize influential interest
groups. As the government does not want to lose its ability to subsidize
these groups, the usual product markets and the market for corporate
control that would otherwise maintain profitable enterprises are largely
muted.
Part of the explanation for the government’s interest in using its
control over private firms to serve interest groups is the government’s
ability to do so off-budget. As such, this Article argues that laws
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governing the debt ceiling of the United States and the financial
statements of the United States should be changed to take into account a
realistic perspective of the government’s obligations that accompany its
ownership in private firms through the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(“TARP”) bailout. This perspective should consolidate the financial
position of firms controlled by the U.S. government, including their
debt, net revenue, and other financial operations, into the financial
systems and laws which govern the approval process and disclosure of the
U.S. government’s finances. In doing so, this Article argues that the
reforms proposed can partially internalize the costs of interest group
pressure to abuse the government’s ownership and can also facilitate the
legislature’s constitutional requirement to oversee appropriations and
debt repayment of the United States. As a secondary thesis, this Article
argues that consolidation of the controlled firms will also present a more
accurate picture to users of government financial statements.
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Separation of Bank and State
I. INTRODUCTION

The essence of finance is the art of balancing equity and debt to
fund the production of the goods and services that drive economic
growth. This system presumes the existence of two distinct
institutions. The first institution is a collection of firms owned by
diversified residual equity holders that manage productive resources
with a streamlined objective of maximizing shareholder wealth. The
second institution is a government that subsidizes interest groups
and regulates market dynamics. The government acts in part to
maintain equitable outcomes and in part to respond to interest
group political pressure.
This Article will examine how the 2008 bailout resulted in a
dynamic that is dangerous to both the capitalist system of resource
allocation, particularly its emphasis on residual equity holder
monitoring, and the American system of government, in particular
its emphasis on checks and balances in the budgeting,
appropriations, and debt oversight process.
In 2008, the nation faced an unprecedented market correction
that threatened limited systemic consequences to a number of large
Wall Street firms. Washington reacted by instituting a bailout of
those firms as well as the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, largely under the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (“TARP”). Washington later extended the bailout to the
automotive sector. The method chosen for the bailout was largely
for the government to take equity investments in firms that received
government funding and backing. The recipient of the lion’s share of
bailout support, American International Group (“AIG”), was also
one of the largest insurance companies in the United States. AIG’s
bailout was directed by the Federal Reserve, a public institution
backed by the Treasury Department but one step removed from the
U.S. government. The second largest recipient was Citigroup, the
largest bank in the United States. The Treasury Department
uniquely took a common-voting equity interest of thirty-four
percent in exchange for the funds it injected into Citigroup. Six
hundred other banks took TARP funding and gave the government
equity shares in return.
The dynamic embraced by the American system of firm
economic resource allocation, buttressed by government regulation
of that system, presumes a hard black line bifurcating the spheres of
private economic activity and government oversight activity. The
393
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bailout of 2008–2009 eviscerates that hard black line and instead
creates a system of perverse incentives to maximize shareholder
wealth while at the same time subsidizing politically powerful interest
groups, despite the fact that the two goals are frequently mutually
exclusive.
When the government controls companies owned by others, it
can use its regulatory leverage, along with its position as a lender of
last resort, to encourage private firms to reorient their activities
toward goals that serve politically influential interest groups. One
would think that private sector resource allocation, including the
market for capital and the market for corporate control, would police
abuses by government shareholders in companies that maintain
private sector ownership. Due to particular aspects of the
government’s role as shareholder, these constraints lose their force.
This is because of the nature of the government’s implicit backing of
government-owned institutions as well as the disparity between the
government’s ability to maintain an information asymmetry in
relation to its implicit obligations. It is also due to the fact the
government actors will have an incentive to maintain their control
over firms that permit off-balance sheet transfers.
The government lacks a credible mechanism to commit to not
bailing out banks.1 To the extent that the bailout will take the form
of equity investment or will otherwise involve the sorts of strings that
will indicate control, this Article will show some changes in the
national debt ceiling statute and accounting rules for the
government’s ownership that may provide the necessary incentive to
limit government interest in bailouts, and permit, if not a
commitment not to bail out banks, at least a limitation on the
prospect of government bailouts. These controls could be expected
to limit the market distortions of bank policy as well as distortions on
bank bond premiums premised on too-big-to-fail cushions.2
This Article argues that the paradox of government ownership,
and the government’s obligations flowing from that ownership, can
at least be minimized in two unique ways. The two methods center
around the central principle that, much like private sector companies
that use minority equity investments to control other companies, and
1. GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARD OF BANK
BAILOUTS 60–66 (2004).
2. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J.
247 (2010).
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much like the United Kingdom and New Zealand’s approach to
recognizing ownership of government-owned entities, the United
States government should consolidate the financial operations of
entities over which it has control and include them in its estimate of
the national debt ceiling and the government’s financial statements.
This methodology would cause the government to partially
internalize the cost of its holding an interest in inherently private
sector entities. As a secondary thesis, this Article argues that the
government can fulfill its disclosure obligations to users of federal
government financial statements by consolidating its ownership, in
particular by giving economists a more accurate picture of the
crowding-out effects of government spending on fiscal growth by
noting the government’s control over what would otherwise be
counted as private sector spending and debt.
This Article examines the laws and accounting methods for
internalizing the cost of government ownership and presenting more
accurate disclosure to users of financial statements. The first method
examines whether the government should follow the lead of its
common law brethren in the United Kingdom and New Zealand by
consolidating its investment in bailout recipients onto the federal
government’s financial statements. This method is supported by an
uncontroverted assessment of the government’s own accounting
principles as well as the use of private sector accounting principles
that hold force in this unique circumstance where the government is
acting like a private sector investor.
This Article does not argue that the U.S. government should
include the operations of TARP recipients in the federal budget
process. In part, this is because the federal budget process has failed
to represent a binding constraint on government appropriations, as
Congressional exceptions to limits like the pay-go rules seem to
overwhelm the rules themselves.3 It is also motivated by the fact that
consolidating the earnings of government-controlled firms into the
federal budget process could be used to actually manipulate the
federal budget by manipulating the controlled company’s earnings.
As the author has explored in previous work, government controlled
firms tend to obtain preferential regulatory treatment.4 Thus it will
3. See Lori Montgomery, House Votes to Revive Pay-As-You-Go Budget Rules, WASH.
POST, Feb. 5, 2010, at A02.
4. See J.W. Verret, The Bailout Through a Public Choice Lens: Government-Controlled
Companies as a Mechanism for Rent Transfer, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1521 (2010).
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be more likely that a government controlled firm could manipulate
its earnings and still avoid investigation by the SEC.
Finally, and most importantly, the government should include
the debt of bailout recipients in the statutory definition of the debt
ceiling. The requirement that Congress periodically vote to extend
the debt ceiling, if at all, helps to maintain the legislature’s
constitutional obligation to oversee the spending and debt
management of the federal government. The debt ceiling statute
affords members of Congress an opportunity to consider the longterm health of the nation’s finances free from the short-term pressure
of the annual budget process. The procedural rules of that vote also
help to limit the log-rolling phenomenon that takes place in budget
votes and is examined in the public choice literature. Furthermore,
the periodic vote on the debt ceiling is subject to filibuster, to which
the annual budget resolution is immune. In short, if the executive
branch faced the prospect of a hard-fought negotiation over a vote
to expand the debt ceiling statute (and it can be hard-fought even if
the executive and legislative branches are run by the same party), and
if, as this Article suggests, the debt ceiling statute included in its
definition those debts held by firms in which the United States
maintained controlling equity ownership, then the executive branch
would have an incentive to privatize its ownership. This would
greatly delay its need to negotiate with Congress over an extension
of the debt ceiling statute.
There is no guarantee that the policy goals advocated in this
Article will be implemented. Even if they are implemented, they may
not fully minimize the costs of government ownership in private
sector entities described in this Article. The changes advocated in
this Article, however, represent the best short-term and politically
feasible policy alternatives that stand to force the government to
internalize the costs of its ownership in formerly private firms. That
cost, incidentally, is tremendous. The government’s current
investment, at cost, is approximately $200 billion. That $200 billion
is used to control trillions in equity by investors who do not have the
incentives or resources to govern their investments in a majority of
banking firms. Those trillions in wealth are housed in the banking
sector, which itself is foundational to the roughly $40 trillion in
publicly traded wealth in the United States.
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II. GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF COMPANIES UNDER THE TARP
BAILOUT
A. History of the TARP Bailout
In response to a dramatic credit freeze that placed the health of
the financial industry under severe pressure in late 2008, the U.S.
government initiated a $700 billion bailout of the financial industry
that mainly consisted of the Treasury purchasing equity in troubled
banks under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”). In order
to execute its mandate to ensure the health of the nation’s banking
system under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (“EESA”),
the Treasury Department purchased controlling interests in hundreds
of the nation’s largest banks, General Motors (“GM”), and Chrysler,
as well as the insurance conglomerate American International Group
(“AIG”) and GMAC, the financing arm of General Motors.5 Under
the Making Home Affordable Program, the Treasury offered to use
nearly $50 billion in TARP funding, in conjunction with at least
$200 billion from the Federal Reserve, to support Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, both of which are now majority-owned by the federal
government under conservatorship.6
The original plan for the TARP program was for the government
to use the $700 billion authorized under the EESA to buy and sell
troubled assets held on the balance sheet of banks.7 That plan was
quickly shelved, and the Treasury Department immediately began a
number of different programs. As part of that bailout, the Treasury
took preferred equity in TARP recipients and subsequently initiated
a plan to convert those non-voting preferred shares into shares

5. Former Treasury Assistant Secretary Phillip Swagel provides a first-hand account of
the implementation of TARP. See Phillip Swagel, The Financial Crisis: An Inside View,
BROOKINGS
PAPERS
ON
ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY,
Spring
2009,
at
1–79,
http://www.brookings.edu/economics/bpea/~/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2009_s
pring_bpea_papers/2009_spring_bpea_swagel.pdf; see also, Steven Rattner, The Auto Bailout:
How We Did It, FORTUNE, Nov. 9, 2009, at 55, available at http://money.cnn.com/2009/
10/21/autos/auto_bailout_rattner.fortune/index.htm?postversion=2009102104.
6. See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM Q. REP., July 21, 2009, at 36, available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/
reports/congress/2009/July2009_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf [hereinafter SIG TARP
REPORT JULY 2009].
7. Id. at 3.
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convertible into voting common equity. The Treasury’s initial
experiment in holding common equity took place at Citigroup, in
which it took a controlling thirty-four percent voting stake.8
The automotive industry also subsequently garnered TARP
support when, in December 2008, the Treasury announced that it
would use TARP funds to establish the Auto Industry Financing
Program (“AIFP”) to stabilize the automotive industry, where over
$17 billion in loans were offered to GM and Chrysler on condition
that they submit restructuring plans.9 The Obama Administration
rejected the initial proposals and instead created the Automotive
Task Force to negotiate a new viability plan.10
The government’s investment through TARP is fairly
concentrated; for instance, as of September 2, 2009, the total
outstanding federal government assistance committed to AIG stood
at $120.7 billion, of which $69.8 billion represented TARP
investment by the Treasury.11 The Treasury’s net investment in GM
and Chrysler totaled $76.9 billion, and investments in Citigroup
stood at $50 billion.12 The total of nearly $200 billion invested
under EESA authority in these four companies represents well more
than half of the $381.4 billion net cumulative funds expended by the
Treasury under TARP as of September 30, 2009. As such, this
Article will focus particular attention on those four companies. This
Article will also analyze Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in conjunction
with TARP recipients, even though technically their conservatorship
preceded TARP.

8. See Robert Schmidt & Bradley Keoun, Citigroup 34% Stake Sale Discussed at U.S.
Treasury, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 15, 2009, 4:15 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=acs7LZGlwiYU.
9. Roger Runningen & John Hughes, GM and Chrysler Will Get $13.4 Billion in U.S.
Loans, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 19, 2008, 5:21 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=newsarchive&sid=aGHdHOHwvZWo; WHITE HOUSE, DETERMINATION OF VIABILITY
SUMMARY: CHRYSLER, LLC (Mar. 30, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
assets/documents/Chrysler_Viability_Assessment.pdf; see also Stephen J. Lubben, No Big
Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 531, 545 (2009).
10. SIG TARP REPORT JULY 2009, supra note 6, at 35; see also Lubben, supra note 9.
11. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-975, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM: STATUS OF GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO AIG (Sept. 2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09975.pdf [hereinafter GAO STATUS REPORT].
12. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM Q. REP., at 43, 67, 90, available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/
2009/October2009_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf [hereinafter SIG TARP REPORT
OCT. 2009].
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B. The Government’s Control Through TARP

A substantial line of authority supports the proposition that
either just having the power to control a company or the actual
exercise of control is sufficient to control a company. In In re
Walston & Co.,13 the SEC held that the power to control could be
evidenced by a creditor’s right to 90% of profits, status as the source
of most of Walston’s business, and the option to acquire stock.14
This was despite the fact that the creditor did not participate in the
actual management of the business and held no actual stock.15 In
effect, the power to control is sufficient to make one a controlling
person, despite the fact that the power is never actually exercised.
SEC v. Franklin Atlas Corp.16 also supports the notion the
percentage of stock ownership is not alone determinative.17 In that
case, a manager with the ability to control an enterprise was
determined to be a control person, even though he actually owned
no stock and the company had a controlling shareholder who owned
a majority of the stock.18
This is analogous to the situation facing many TARP banks. The
U.S. government is a substantial creditor of the companies in
addition to owning positions in them,19 and also holds the ability to
substantially affect the bank’s underlying business through its
discretion in setting capital requirements and limiting bank
operations. Under this view, the fact that Treasury or the Federal
Reserve did not engage in active management of TARP banks, and
the fact that Treasury’s ownership in most TARP participants is nonvoting, would therefore be irrelevant to this determination.
In the opening chapter of the auto bailout, the government’s
behavior also evidences Treasury’s control of that industry through
its investments. In its September 2009 report, the Congressional

13. 7 S.E.C. 937 (1940).
14. A.A. Sommer, Jr., Who’s “In Control”?—S.E.C., 21 BUS. LAW. 559, 564 (1966)
(citing Walston, 7 S.E.C. at 937).
15. Id. at 564 (citing Walston, 7 S.E.C. at 937).
16. 154 F. Supp. 395, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
17. Sommer, supra note 14, at 565 (citing Franklin Atlas, 154 F. Supp. at 395).
18. See id. at 559.
19. Press Release, U.S. Treasury, U.S. Treasury Releases Terms of Capital Assistance
Program (Feb. 25, 2009), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
tg40.aspx. See also J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and
Practice, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 294–301 (2010) [hereinafter Verret, Treasury Inc.].
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Oversight Panel concluded that Treasury “used its own assumptions
to conduct stress tests on these plans, looked at a variety of scenarios
in order to formulate cash flow capability and the likely earnings
capacity of the companies, challenged the companies to look
forward, and created models of ‘potential enterprise value.’”20 The
Automotive Task Force was an especially active participant in the
proceedings, which saw replacement of the CEO and half of the
board of directors, bankruptcy filings, debtor-in-possession
financing, and wholesale financial and business restructuring.21
In AIG and GM, U.S. government voting rights constitute
outright majorities (nearly 80 percent in AIG and 61 percent in
GM), while in Citigroup and Chrysler, the combination of
concentrated government shareholding and the broad scope of
additional federal support22 justifies the description of the U.S.
government as a dominant shareholder.
In the case of AIG, a trusteeship model was formally
implemented. The trustees nominated by the Federal Reserve to
govern the trust have argued that the Federal Reserve’s action
minimized any control the government may have over AIG.23 On
January 16, 2009, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(“FRBNY”), acting in consultation with the Treasury Department,
entered into an agreement24 with three private individuals named as

20. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OVERSIGHT REPORT: USE OF TARP FUNDS IN THE
SUPPORT AND REORGANIZATION OF THE DOMESTIC AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 104 (Sep. 9,
2009) (citing Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Testimony of
Senior Advisor at the U.S. Department of Treasury Ron Bloom, The State of the Domestic
Automobile Industry: Impact of Federal Assistance, at 5–6 (June 10, 2009)).
21. See generally Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 19.
22. For example, federal support to Citigroup includes a potential federal liability of as
much as $260 billion for guarantees of $300 billion of the bank’s pool of asset-backed
securities. According to the SIG TARP’s Quarterly Report to Congress issued on October 21,
2009, SIG TARP REPORT OCT. 2009 supra note 12, at 69, the list of assets to be “ringfenced” was not finalized, but was expected to be finalized by October 31, 2009. Initial plans
called for Citigroup to absorb $39.5 billion in losses prior to government support; TARP
assets would cover the next $5 billion in losses, id. at 42, with FDIC ($10 billion) and the
Federal Reserve bank of New York responsible for any remaining requirements.
23. Statement of the Trustees of the AIG Credit Facility Trust Before the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 1 (2009) (joint statement of Jill M.
Considine, Chester B. Feldberg & Douglass L. Foshee), available at http://
www.aigcreditfacilitytrust.com/aigweb/internet/en/files/Written%20Statement_tcm1121242400.pdf.
24. AIG Credit Facility Trust Agreement (Jan. 16, 2009), http://
www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/AIGCFTAgreement.pdf.
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Trustees and placed the authority to vote the government’s shares in
AIG in the hands of the Trustees.25
The Trust agreement gave the Trustees the “exclusive right to
vote the Trust Stock, or give written consent, in person or by proxy,
at all meetings of stockholders of the Company.”26 Section 2.04(f) of
the trusteeship agreement further states that “[i]n no event shall the
Trustees become directors of the Company or otherwise become
responsible for directing or managing the day-to-day operations of
the Company or any of its subsidiaries.” The AIG Trust insulates the
trustees from liability so long as they believe they acted lawfully and
“in or not opposed to the best interests of the Treasury.”27
Two substantial reports released by the GAO discuss the U.S.
shareholding in AIG and in the auto companies.28 Regarding federal
government oversight of AIG, the GAO’s report found, “While the
government has not taken over management of AIG, it has taken a
number of steps to create certain controls over AIG’s management
of the company.”29 The Federal Reserve and FRBNY have between
twenty and twenty-five people assigned to monitor AIG, and
FRBNY has hired professional advisors to assist in monitoring.
Notably, FRBNY officials receive weekly detailed reports on cash
forecasts, liquidity updates, and regulatory developments.30 The
GAO found that in June 2009 AIG trustees used their voting power
to force changes in a majority of the company’s directors, and that
the new board subsequently hired a new chief executive officer in
August 2009.31 Instead of reflecting a hands-off approach to
governance, however, the GAO found that Treasury and the FRBNY

25. The agreement provided no binding guidance to the Trustees on the objectives for
which shareholding was to be exercised, prevented the Trustees from taking a seat on the
Board of Directors of AIG, and indemnified the Trustees against any liability for decisions they
might make regarding voting of AIG shares. Id. §§ 2.04(f), 3.03(d). However, the Agreement
includes a fiduciary duty provision which requires the AIG Trustees to act in the best interests
of the Treasury. Id. § 2.05(a).
26. Id. § 2.04(b).
27. Id. § 3.03(a).
28. See GAO STATUS REPORT, supra note 11; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-10-151, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: CONTINUED STEWARDSHIP NEEDED AS
TREASURY DEVELOPS STRATEGIES FOR MONITORING AND DIVESTING FINANCIAL INTERESTS
IN CHRYSLER AND GM (Nov. 2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d10151.pdf.
29. GAO STATUS REPORT, supra note 11, at 37.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 38.
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“continue to have their own relationship [with AIG management]
and conduct their own monitoring of AIG operations.”32
On June 1, 2009, after Chrysler’s reorganization had been
approved by a bankruptcy court, President Obama announced that
the United States would be supporting a similar approach with
General Motors and would be converting existing and new loans to
both companies into common equity.33 In a press briefing given the
evening before the President’s press conference, an administration
official summarized the White House position on “Government as
Shareholder.”34 The Treasury Department’s statement on the GM
restructuring says that it intends to manage its investment in GM in
a “hands-off . . . commercial manner.”35 The Treasury also published
a white paper regarding its ownership in GM in which it offered four
key principles for how it would try to minimize political influence in
GM’s operations; yet there is no mechanism by which those
principles can be enforced by a third party, nor are there any
penalties for their violation.36
The government holds non-voting preferred stock in most of the
TARP recipients, with the exception of Citigroup and the
automotive companies. Notwithstanding the non-voting nature of
the Treasury’s investment in TARP firms, the government’s
ownership of TARP-preferred shares gives the government leverage
over the business decisions of these firms.37 For example, the TARP
provisions allow the Treasury to nominate two “preferred directors”
to the board in the event that a TARP firm misses six consecutive
32. Id.
33. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on General Motors Restructuring
(Jun. 1, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-onGeneral-Motors-Restructuring.
34. Senior Administration Officials, Background Briefing on the General Motors
Restructuring (May 31, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/BackgroundBriefing-on-GM-Restructuring-May-31-2009.
35. Id.
36. SIG TARP REPORT JULY 2009, supra note 6, at 111. Core principles in the
Treasury’s White Paper include to i) “seek to dispose of its ownership interest as soon as
practicable;” ii) “reserve the right to set upfront conditions to protect taxpayers, promote
financial stability, and encourage growth;” iii) “protect the taxpayers’ investment by managing
its ownership stake in a hands-off, commercial manner;” and iv) “vote on core governance
issues, including the selection of a company’s board of directors and major corporate events or
transactions.” Id.
37. J.W. Verret, The U.S. Government as Control Shareholder of the Financial and
Automotive Sector: Implications and Analysis (George Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper No.
09-13, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1348256.
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quarterly dividend payments.38 “Treasury[‘s] preferred shares also
retain[] the right to vote on any mergers or exchange activity and on
new issuance of shares.”39 The government also mandated certain
corporate governance changes for TARP firms. “Assuming that
Treasury maintains the legal authority to waive those provisions, it
could offer to do so in exchange for other changes in corporate
policy.”40
Much of this Article will consider the implications of the
government’s ownership in TARP recipients, Fannie Mae, Freddie
Mac, and AIG together. Therefore, it will generally not be necessary
to delineate between them for the broad theoretical and budget law
considerations examined. As such, these entities generally will be
referred to as “Bailed-Out Entities” or “BOEs.” Where issues are
driven by characteristics particular to an entity, as in the case of
differential accounting by Federal rules between Fannie Mae and
other bailed-out companies, the various BOEs will be examined
separately.
III. ECONOMIC THEORY AND EVIDENCE OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED
COMPANIES
The final objective of this Article is to determine the appropriate
method of representing the government’s economic ownership of
BOEs in its financial reporting and the appropriate method for
harnessing the existing structures that check the federal
government’s borrowing and spending authority to oversee the
government’s investment. But before we can do that, we will need to
develop an appreciation for the economic nature and the attendant
costs of government ownership. This Section will examine the
existing theoretical and empirical evidence on government ownership
to develop one of the foundational justifications for the thesis that
limiting the depth and nature of government ownership in private
firms is desirable. This Section will use economic theory, as well as
evidence from government ownership from around the globe, to
offer some predictions for how governments will make decisions as
controlling shareholders.

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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Comparisons to the different forms of government ownership in
Europe, Asia, and South America teach that government-owned
banks are frequently used to advance political agendas to the
detriment of a bank’s financial health. Advancing a political agenda
may actually be easier through controlling common equity stakes, an
effective semi-nationalization, than through outright nationalization.
A government agency using shareholder power over private
companies has two unique freedoms: 1) the ability to bypass the
administrative law process, the separation of powers, and the judicial
review that constrain regulatory discretion, and instead simply
require the board to initiate corporate policy changes favored by the
Treasury;41 and 2) the ability to bypass the federal budget process
and instead require banks that are not included in the federal budget
to themselves fund the transfers.42 The combination of these
exceptions to federal law undermines transparency constraints that
work to minimize transfers to political interest groups and instead
allows the government to require the bank to make those transfers in
the form of increased lending and artificial interest rate caps that
reside entirely off the federal budget.43
41. See Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s
Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 468 (2009).
42. See id. at 489. The consequences of moving the debt of private banks onto the
public budget can be severe. For instance, when the United Kingdom moved the liabilities of
two bailed-out banks in which it owns a control stake (i.e., Royal Bank of Scotland Group and
Lloyds Banking Group) onto the public balance sheet, it added $2.136 trillion to the public
debt, more than doubling the U.K.’s public debt. Alistair McDonald & Laurence Norman,
Bank Bailouts, Sinking Revenue Fray U.K.’s Ledger, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2009, at A10.
43. Part of the relationship between Fannie and Freddie was a sort of interest group
feedback loop that demonstrates this problem. Fannie and Freddie were permitted to lobby
Congress with political donations. Peter Wallison, How Paulson Would Save Fannie Mae,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2008, at A17. When the government was forced to take Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac into conservatorship, the government did not completely eliminate preferred
and common stockholders, but limited its stake to 79.9%. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 41,
at 489. Davidoff and Zaring offer four reasons which may have informed the decision to leave
some equity outstanding: 1) support of Treasury’s position that it did not have to consolidate
the Government-Sponsored Enterprises (“GSEs”) onto the federal budget, 2) keeping the
GSEs from having to adopt government accounting rules, 3) permitting the GSEs to deduct
interest on their government loans from their taxes (which they would not be able to do if
deemed government controlled), and 4) keeping the government from becoming liable for the
GSEs retirement liabilities. Id. at 489. David Moffett, Freddie’s most recent CEO, resigned
after just six months, citing social mandates from the government that impeded his ability to
turn around the company and make it profitable. James R. Hagerty & Joann S. Lublin, Freddie
Chief Quits after Six Months, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2009, at A4. Prior to the revelations of
accounting irregularities at the two GSEs, its dedicated regulator performed the sort of
inspections and audits typical of a financial regulator without uncovering any problems. Peter
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In the context of government ownership of private sector
entities, the nature of the government’s accounting for its potential
future liabilities is one concern driving the analysis in this Article.
Other distinct concerns in this context are the distorting effects that
government ownership has on the operations of the business in
which it owns an interest. Still a third concern is that the prospect of
government bailout also distorts market outcomes through moral
hazard. As such, after examining the economic theory and evidence
describing these effects, this Article will analyze how to use laws
limiting the national debt and government accounting principles to
achieve three goals: 1) present a more accurate picture of the
government’s obligations to users of government financial reports;
2) increase the cost to the government for bailing out private sector
entities to restrict instances of bailout to only those situations
actually implicating systemic risk concerns; and 3) encourage the
government to divest of equity positions taken in bailed-out
companies as soon as possible, rather than use its equity control to
effectuate public policy outcomes.
A. Theory of Government Owned Firms
Government shareholders certainly are not the only shareholders
that can alter the value of the firm by virtue of their presence as an
owner. Evidence suggests that the relationship between ownership
by managers and firm value is concave.44 This is because other
shareholders may be concerned that the larger shareholder will use
their control over the firm to encourage corporate policy changes
that work to the larger shareholder’s advantage at the expense of the
other shareholders in the firm. The relationship is not static,
however, and changes as the relative tradeoff between extracting
private value and losing their proportional value invested in the firm
J. Wallison, Moral Hazard on Steroids: The OFHEO Report Shows that Regulation Cannot
Protect U.S. Taxpayers, FIN. SERVICES OUTLOOK (Am. Enterprise Inst. for Pub. Pol’y
Research), July 2006, at 3, available at http://www.aei.org/outlook/24591 [hereinafter
Wallison, Moral Hazard]. Everyone was, however, completely taken by surprise when, for
instance, the board of Freddie Mac dismissed its top two officers for accounting irregularities.
Peter J. Wallison, The Evolution of a Policy Idea: How Restrictions on the Size of the GSEs’
Portfolios Became the Central Issue in Reform of Their Regulation 14 (NFI, Working Paper No.
2006-PB-03, 2006), available at http://www.aei.org/paper/24056 [hereinafter Wallison,
The Evolution of a Policy Idea].
44. Renè M. Stulz, Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the
Market for Corporate Control, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 25, 25–54 (1988).
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changes for shareholders with larger percentage ownership.45 A
debate has ensued in the corporate governance and finance literature
considering at what point the cost of large shareholders exceeds the
benefits they offer by lowering agency costs in oversight of firm
managers.46 The unique incentives facing government ownership in
the circumstances that are the subject of this Article introduce a new
twist to this debate.
Outside of the United States, many Western countries have
historically been characterized by significant government ownership
of private companies.47 The United States, however, largely
abandoned government investment in private companies after a
significant period in the 1840s of explicit use of mixed enterprises as
instruments of public policy.48 One of the reasons for the
government’s interest in taking a controlling investment in private
companies is to utilize its investment to transfer funds to interest
groups off of the federal budget. This permits the benefit of
appeasing political supporters without the cost of raising taxes or
taking on debt. In the dynamic analyzed in this Article, the
government is taking an interest in companies in which investors
either maintain or formerly held an equity interest, a structure that is
fairly new in the United States.49
45. Stijn Claessens et al., Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large
Shareholdings, 57 J. FIN. 2741, 2741–71 (2002).
46. For the argument that the incentives to extract private value are the more powerful
incentive for large shareholder, see Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, One Share-One
Vote and the Market for Corporate Control, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 175 (1988); Andrei Shleifer &
Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997). For the other
side of the debate, that the benefits of lowering agency costs will tend to exceed the costs of
large shareholder private wealth extraction, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman &
George G. Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms
and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights, in CONCENTRATED
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 295 (Randall K Morck ed., 2000).
47. Stephen Brooks, The Mixed Ownership Corporation as an Instrument of Public Policy,
19 COMP. POL. 173, 173–74 (1987).
48. Id. at 176. Brooks examines some cases in which mixed enterprises were able to
maintain autonomy from the government, such as the case of British Petroleum (BP) refusing
to divert sales of oil to foreign customers to subsidize British oil consumption during the 1973
oil embargo. Id. at 178–79. It may, however, remain difficult to determine whether
expressions of managerial autonomy are in fact reflective of a lack of distortionary control
exercised by the government shareholder. In particular, such exercise of managerial authority
may be merely the result of collusion, either explicit or implicit, between the government and
the managers in ways that work to the detriment of other shareholders or to the value of the
taxpayer’s investment.
49. The same dynamic has been studied in the related area of off-budget public sector
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Alcian and Demsetz argue that firm ownership of productive
assets offers unique efficiencies as firms obtain superior information
about the uses and productivity of internal firm assets, thus reducing
the cost of searching out combinations of productive assets.50 The
government-owned firm limits this advantage, however, because the
government will have an interest in using resources based not on
their efficiency or effectiveness but on rewarding political support
from resources or owners of resources either inside or outside the
firm.51 Theory developed to appreciate the implications of pure
government ownership of productive assets can inform our
understanding of mixed ownership. Peltzman examines the question
of pure government ownership of firms when he asks, “If a privately
owned firm is socialized, and nothing else changes, how will the
ownership change alone affect the firm’s behavior?”52 Peltzman
opens by noting that, although government owners will initially have
an interest in maximizing firm profits because it will limit the tax
burden on constituents, their interest in maintaining their
incumbency means they will be willing to trade those profits to
obtain support.53 As such, government owners can be expected to

authorities designed explicitly for the purpose of off-budget public activities. These institutions
were intended to evade public debt limitation laws passed to constrict runaway spending by
legislatures and town councils. See C. Robert Morris, Jr., Evading Debt Limitations with Public
Building Authorities: The Costly Subversion of State Constitutions, 68 YALE L.J. 234 (1958). As
such, since their activities don’t alter the debt calculations for their sponsoring municipal
organizations, they operate off of the budgets of their sponsoring governments as well. They
are pitched as self-financing organizations, but most end up requiring government subsidy and
backing to operate, making their off-budget classification a frequently misleading fiction. See
generally JAMES T. BENNETT & THOMAS J. DILORENZO, UNDERGROUND GOVERNMENT:
THE OFF-BUDGET PUBLIC SECTOR 587 (1983). For the unique nature of the TARP
companies, see Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 19, at 293.
50. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 793 (1972).
51. One of Alcian and Demsetz’s explanations for why firms exist is to solve the
problem of metering, or linking rewards to outputs, in team production where marginal
products of team members is not easily observable. Id. at 778–83. The claimant with the right
to residual earnings will have the best incentive to monitor team inputs and meter the marginal
productivity of inputs to the team’s output. Id. at 782. But this requires an ability to discipline
individual team members and revise or terminate their contracts. Id. at 782–83. With the
government as shareholder, this power to discipline is either reduced or potentially used for the
wrong reasons. Managers are no longer disciplined for shirking, but for failing to maximize
utility for the interest groups to which the government shareholder is beholden.
52. Sam Peltzman, Pricing in Public and Private Enterprises: Electric Utilities in the
United States, 14 J.L. & ECON. 109, 110 (1971).
53. Id. at 112–14.
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use the pricing system to confer benefits on voters and interest
groups.54 Peltzman notes that in order to yield a net political gain,
government owners will likely be required to charge differential
prices to benefit a majority of consumers.55 This would correspond
with the administration’s emphasis on pressuring TARP recipients to
renegotiate mortgages rather than alter rates across the board, since
loan forgiveness is effectively targeted as a price rebate to lower
income consumers. Peltzman also argues that the government
owned firm will be able to subsidize specific groups with less cost to
the government through differential pricing than through changes to
tax and subsidy policy.56
Since the government will be less willing to sell out its position
and lose the off-balance-sheet subsidy mechanism, the market for
corporate control as a limiting boundary on manager shirking within
the private firm, explored by Henry Manne, will also be muted.57
One prerequisite to a shareholder’s ability to act as an efficient
monitor is his ability to sell his bundle of rights, including interest in
residual claims and monitoring rights.58 This helps to create a market
that, if liquid, can help to reveal the expected present market value of
the firm’s future production. But there are a few constraints that
limit a government’s ability or interest in selling its investment, one
of which is its inability to continue to use the entity for off-budget
transfers if it has sold its investment.59 That is not to say that the
government will not agree to sell its investment in TARP firms,
because it has already done so for Bank of America and others. It is
worth noting, however, that the pressures that will limit that option
for other firms, particularly those like AIG, in which the government
has a large stake and the profitability of the firm, will remain in
severe stress for the foreseeable future.
Another cost associated with government ownership of private
firms that limits the ability to ever actually privatize the firm is that
government ownership can represent a shift in institutional design in

54. Id.
55. Id. at 113.
56. Id. at 119–20.
57. For the origins of the theory of the market for corporate control as a disciplining
mechanism, see generally Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73
J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
58. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 50, at 783.
59. See Peltzman, supra note 52, at 119–20.
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midstream. The firms are initially organized to maximize returns for
residual claimants, but once they are bailed out and the government
takes an equity interest in the firm, it can acquire a dual mandate:
maximize profits and facilitate the public interest. The government
can take steps to limit the ability of private investors to monitor how
fulfilling that dual mandate imposes costs on the other residual
claimant shareholders. For instance, the government can give
government-owned firms preferential regulatory treatment in rules
designed to require firms to provide informative disclosures to
investors. The Treasury Department’s position on Fannie Mae is an
example of how the government emphasizes the national interest
mission of a private business.60 And yet some evidence suggests that
only highly profitable companies can be effectively privatized. Thus,
the more the government uses the firm for off-balance sheet
subsidies, the less likely it will be to privatize the firm.61
Another criticism of government-owned firms is that the threat
of bankruptcy or takeover, which would otherwise discipline
management, is not present in government-run firms.62 This criticism
supplements the view that governments will reorient the company’s
objective from profit maximization to other goals like employment
maximization.63 When the government’s interest is only a partial
interest, many of these problems remain because governments tend
60. Fannie and Freddie: The Last SIVs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2010, at A18.
61. Pint’s study of the British nationalization and subsequent privatization of coal and
other industries suggests that governments are more concerned with the redistribution of
interest group benefits than with economic efficiency in both of those processes. Ellen M. Pint,
Nationalization and Privatization: A Rational-Choice Perspective on Efficiency, 10 J. PUB.
POL’Y 267, 270 (1990). The National Coal Board that was created as part of Britain’s
nationalization of the coal industry was charged with “making supplies of coal available in such
quantities and at such prices as may seem to them best calculated to further the public
interest.” Id. at 274. The British Treasury also tended to distribute any profits from the
industries they oversaw to labor, rather than minimize the costs to government nationalization
by returning those profits to the Treasury. Id. at 276. It was also found that once
nationalization occurred, it became very difficult to re-privatize those firms unless they
returned to profitability. Id. at 279. This occurs because the only alternative is for the
government to shut down the firm and fire the workers, which governments are loathe to do,
and because after the interest groups have had their way with the firm, the firm becomes
worthless without the government guarantee behind it.
62. Alexander Muravyev, Federal State Shareholdings in Russian Companies: Origin,
Forms and Consequences for Enterprise Performance 17 (Bank of Fin. Inst. for Economies in
Transition, Discussion Paper No. 12, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1015707.
63. Id. (citing Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Politicians and Firms, 109 Q.J.
ECON. 995 (1994); Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Theory of
Privatisation, 106 ECON. J. 309 (1996)).
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to bail out firms in which they have an equity stake with greater
frequency.64 When other shareholders lose confidence in
management, they sell their stock, but when governments lose
confidence in management, they inject more capital into the firm.
This means that the bankruptcy constraint is minimized. If the
government maintains the ability to limit takeovers through voting
in M&A situations, it will also exacerbate the managerial limitation.
B. Evidence Regarding Government-Owned Firms
A substantial amount of prior literature evidences the risks of the
second form of government nationalization of banks. However,
there is relatively little literature on government ownership of private
and publicly traded firms in the United States; thus, most of this
Section will require an international focus.65 With respect to the
banking industry in particular, a leading study finds that government
ownership of banks is negatively correlated with financial
development and economic growth.66 One study uses comparisons
across 36 countries to reveal that governments tend to lend more
64. Id. at 18.
65. One of the few existing systematic studies of government ownership in private firms
in the United States is from Stacey Kole and J. Harold Mulherin. Stacey R. Kole & J. Harold
Mulherin, The Government as a Shareholder: A Case from the United States, 40 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1997). They focus on a sample of 17 firms in which the government held a large stake just
following World War II, largely as a result of the federal government seizing corporate assets of
Japanese and German companies. Id. at 3–4. The comparison is limited, only 7 of the 17 had
shares traded publicly at the time of seizure. Id. at 6. Further, the type of business will have
some effect on the level of subsidization activity the firm will be encouraged to provide.
Interest groups and voters will not be equally motivated to obtain subsidies from the same
firms with the same level of interest. The five firms that Kole and Muhlerin target to determine
effect of government ownership on growth are American Potash, American Bosch, General
Aniline and Film, Rohm & Haas, and Schering. Id. at 9–10. One was an engine parts
manufacturer, another was a commercial solvents manufacturer. The mean number of
employees at these firms was 2,810. See id. at 10. By contrast, the mean number of employees
of the top TARP recipients is much larger, thus creating a more powerful interest group
feedback loop in TARP recipients than in the five firms focused on in the Kole and Mulhern
inquiry. For example, AIG has 96,000 employees. See CNNMONEY.COM, http://
money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2010/snapshots/2469.html (last visited
Feb. 2, 2011). The unique thing about both the banking and automotive industries is that
they serve as a potential subsidy vehicle for nearly every household that buys a car or owns a
home. By using a bank to encourage lowering interest rates, the government can directly
transfer wealth to those households without needing to recognize the transfer on the
government’s books and without facing a challenge from the bank.
66. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Government
Ownership of Banks, 57 J. FIN. 265 (2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=309161.
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generously, compared to private banks, during election years.67 One
empirical examination of state-owned banks in Italy found that, all
else equal, state-owned banks charge an average of 44 basis points
less than privately held banks for the same borrower.68 This study
also found that companies in certain political regions lent money at
different rates, with regions in which the national political party held
more power likely to experience lower interest rates from the state
owned banks than other areas.69
Other studies directly compare the efficiency of governmentowned firms to that of private firms. Boardman and Vining point to

67. I. Serdar Dinç, Politicians and Banks: Political Influences on Government-Owned
Banks in Emerging Markets, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 435 (2005).
68. Paola Sapienza, What do State-Owned Firms Maximize? Evidence from Italian
Banks 3 (2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=303381.
69. Id. Sapienza has also found that government run banks in Italy lend at rates
approximately 20 to 50 basis points lower than private banks. Id. at 11–14. The case of India’s
bank nationalization is also instructive. See Shawn A. Cole, Financial Development, Bank
Ownership, and Growth. Or, Does Quantity Imply Quality? 23 (Harvard Business Sch., Working
Paper No. 09-002, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1158078. “In 1980, the
government of India nationalized all private banks with a deposit base above Rs. 2 billion.” Id.
at 2. Those banks were subject to direct control of the federal government, with the entire
board of directors nominated by the ruling party. Id. at 7. Between the nationalization of 1969
and 2000 “there were twenty-one private bank failures in India. Banarjee, Cole and Duflo
[found] that the cost to the government of making whole depositors in [those] failed banks
was less than the cost of recapitalizing public sector banks,” after adjusting for scale. Id. at 8
(citing Abhijit V. Banerjee, Shawn Cole & Esther Duflo, Banking Reform in India, 1 INDIA
POL’Y F. 273 (2005), available at http://www.brookings.edu/global/ipf/banerjee_
cole_duflo.pdf). The identified goal of the Indian nationalization was to increase the scope of
banking and lending in rural areas. Id. at 19. This rural focus was intended to benefit lower
income groups, and by association the agriculture industry. Id. at 22. The effect of the Indian
nationalization was that nationalized banks grew more slowly than private banks in the 1990s,
and that they lent more to agricultural, rural areas, and to the government at the expense of
lending to trade, transport, and the financial industry. Id. at 13. Cole found that towns with
nationalized branches experienced an annual growth rate of 2–3% higher than rural towns
without nationalized branches during 1980–1990, and the amount of credit in those towns
increased by a factor of 1.5 to 2.5. Id. at 20. He also found, however, that the effect of
increased credit on rural towns was not a sustained impact, as the annual growth rate in towns
with nationalized banks was 2–4% lower from 1990–2000, essentially wiping out the prior
decade’s additional growth. Id. This suggests that the additional liquidity was merely invested
in bad loans. Nationalization also resulted in a significant reallocation of lending to agriculture
as well as lower interest rates. Id. at 21–24. Government ownership also reduced the quality of
financial intermediation as evidenced by the fact that loans made by public sector banks were
substantially more likely to default than loans issued by private sector banks, eventually
resulting in a substantial drain on the public treasury when the national government eventually
recapitalized them. Id. at 23. Further, Indian bank nationalization failed to even attain its
modest goal of increased employment or increased investment in the agricultural sector over
the long term, despite the high cost of nationalization. Id. at 24–27.
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a large body of literature which studies the efficiency of governmentowned firms as compared to private firms.70 They construct a model
that examines 500 state-owned, mixed-ownership, and private
companies operating internationally in competitive environments,
and find that on average state-owned enterprises have a return on
equity that is 12 percent less than private companies.71 They also
note that the firms in their study were not nationalized as a result of
poor performance, thus removing bailout as a reason for the lower
value of government-owned firms.72 They also note that performance
of mixed-ownership companies tended to be worse than state-owned
companies, leading to a suggestion that partial nationalization can
actually be worse than full nationalization.73
Various studies on privatization of state-owned enterprises offer a
useful comparison for the costs of government ownership,
particularly as many of those studies indicate that privatization makes
state owned firms run more efficiently.74 Thus we can indirectly get a
view for how government shareholders operate by considering how
the value of the firm changes after the government closes its
ownership position. A study of Russian privatization indicates that
firms in which the government kept residual equity ownership
received preferential treatment in the application of government
regulations over firms that were not government owned, magnifying
the distorting effects of government ownership.75 This is similar to
the exemption from the federal securities laws that Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac were able to obtain for so long, as well as Wallison’s
suspicion that they received preferential treatment in application of
the antitrust laws.

70. Anthony E. Boardman & Aidan R. Vining, Ownership and Performance in
Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed and StateOwned Enterprises, 32 J.L. & ECON. 1, 4–5 (1989) (noting that much of the investigation is
skewed by the fact that most of the industries are Western, in which most government owned
firms are intensely regulated industries, particularly utilities, which limit their application to a
study of government versus privately owned firms in more competitive environments).
71. Boardman & Vining, supra note 70, at 17.
72. Id. at 23.
73. Id. at 26.
74. William L. Megginson & Jeffrey M. Netter, From State to Market: A Survey of
Empirical Studies on Privatization, 39 J. ECON. LITERATURE 321, 380 (2001).
75. Daniel Berkowitz & Yadviga Semikolenova, Privatization with Government Control:
Evidence from the Russian Oil Sector 22 (William Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 826,
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=920509.
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Direct nationalization offers more concrete control for the
government. Unions are the stakeholder most likely to seek influence
in a government owned firm.76 One of the reasons why nationalized,
or even partially nationalized, firms are difficult to then re-privatize is
that stakeholders obtain patronage networks from the firm through
political influence; thus privatization requires a substantial political
battle.77 Study of nationalization and privatization is thus useful in
considering the Treasury’s equity holdings, but the best analogy for
the semi-nationalization created by the Treasury’s TARP holdings is
the case of nationalized firms in which governments maintain
significant and powerful residual holdings. Those residual holdings
were particularly characterized by the power to block acquisitions,
known as golden shares.78 Those governments’ residual holdings also
76. See Aaron Tornell, Privatizing the Privatized 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. W7206, 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=202743.
77. See id. One of the political explanations for privatization in late twentieth century
Britain was that the conservative government was interested in allocating underpriced equity to
the middle class through privatization, which would then create a constituency that would
support market oriented policies and thereby increase the Conservatives’ chance of reelection.
See Bernardo Bortolotti & Mara Faccio, Government Control of Privatized Firms, 22 REV. FIN.
STUD. 2907, 2926 (2009). In effect, the privatization itself would give voters more of a stake
in the profitability of the enterprise, thereby ensuring that they would support government
policies supportive of the business management already allied with the conservative
government. In the United States, this motive for privatization would not likely hold because
equity holdings are already widely distributed among the middle class. And so, at the very least,
pointing to Europe as justification for the fact that governments can be forced to induce
privatization of firms they have run may be troublesome. The only other inducement to
privatization we have seen is that governments can be induced to divest themselves of
profitable firms if the public budget is in severe stress. See id. at 2928. This implies that only
banks in which interest group rents do not capture all of the firm’s profits could be later
privatized by the Treasury. But even when they do privatize, that privatization may be only
partial. Governments face pressure to maintain powerful residual ownership in the privatized
firms. The Russian privatization experience also supports the idea that privatization is more
likely when the government is suffering from severe budget deficits. See Muravyev, supra note
62, at 12. Russian firms with residual government ownership were also characterized by the
presence of government officials in administrative and board positions. Id. at 14. Those
representatives had little experience in the underlying business. Id.
78. See generally Larry Catá Backer, The Private Law of Public Law: Public Authorities as
Shareholders, Golden Shares, Sovereign Wealth Funds, and the Public Law Element in Private
Choice of Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1801, 1807 (2008); see also Bortolotti & Faccio, supra note
77, at 2908, 2918–19; Jullian Ellison & Duncan Reed, Getting Tough on Golden Shares, FIN.
TIMES, June 6, 2003. During the privatization wave of the 1980s and 90s in Western Europe,
governments sold off majority stakes in airlines, automotive and other manufacturers, banks,
utilities, and a variety of other industries. Many of them kept shares that included provisions
that permitted the holder to block any merger or acquisition of the newly privatized company.
See Bortolotti & Faccio, supra note 77, at 2907–09. Though these shares represented minority
positions in those firms, the ability to veto mergers gave state investors a powerful voice in the
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gave them the ability to also influence major corporate policy
decisions.79
It is also interesting to note that nearly two-thirds of privatized
firms in Europe during the great privatization wave of the 1980s and
1990s, from a sample including firms privatized prior to 1996, were
characterized by this form of powerful residual government
control.80 This indicates that once American banks have come under
government control for the purposes of running them as enterprises,
even if they can later be re-privatized, the Treasury may also be
expected to maintain for the federal government residual interests
whose control exceeds their proportionate interest. The
consequences of residual golden shares can threaten the profitability
of the partially privatized firm.81 One study found that more fully
privatized firms tended to be more profitable than those in which
governments had powerful residual equity holdings, with market-tobook and return-on-equity ratios negatively correlated with a
decreased level of privatization.82
One may argue that the market for equity and debt in mixedownership firms would limit the firm’s freedom of action to accede
to government mandates that reduce profit. However, two unique

company’s decision-making. Id. Many argue that those governments used their rights in
golden shares to block legitimate offers to acquire those companies out of an interest in
maintaining inefficiently high levels of employment or reducing cross-border flows of capital
and services. For instance, France and Germany have been the subject of extensive litigation
before the European Commission over their golden shares in, for instance, Airbus and
Volkswagen. These golden shares typically possessed powers, among which were “(1) the right
to appoint members to corporate boards; (2) the right to consent to or veto the acquisition of
relevant interests in the privatized companies; and (3) other rights . . . to consent to . . .
ordinary management” changes. Id. at 2918. Those European governments with the right to
appoint directors frequently appointed government officials to the board. See id. at 2919.
79. See Bortolotti and Faccio, supra note 77, at 2907–08.
80. See id. at 2909.
81. One might ask why constituents of the corporation would lobby for policies which
may threaten the long term profitability, and by extension the long term viability, of the
corporation from which they seek to extract rents. But even with its interest in general public
welfare, rather than profit maximization, the opportunity costs of employees who were never
employed in industry, that otherwise may have been under competitive pricing, or the
opportunity costs of shareholder returns to private pensions that do not otherwise accrue as a
result of the price controls, are not factored into the analysis. These hidden costs cannot make
their way through the political process to exert pressure because actors who would otherwise
lobby for these opportunities, like future stockholders or future consumers, do not know of
their potential interest ahead of time. And so, as an interest group, they are unable to organize
to protect their interest.
82. See Bortolotti & Faccio, supra note 77, at 23.
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aspects of mixed-ownership firms distort that mechanism, and they
are readily observable in the case of the government-sponsored
enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. As a particularly egregious
example of how Fannie and Freddie’s operational risks were ignored
by private markets due to the government’s backing, Fannie and
Freddie were not permitted to file financial statements with the SEC
starting in 2003 due to revelations of earnings manipulations and
accounting fraud.83 And yet, during the years that investors had no
access to filed financial statements, the demand for Fannie and
Freddie debt continued unabated.84 Although, Fannie and Freddie
were originally chartered by Congress as federal agencies, they were
later privatized by a sale of equity in their operations to private
shareholders in order to ensure that their purchases and sales of
mortgages could be removed from the federal budget.85
Nonetheless, members of Congress expected Fannie and Freddie to
subsidize low-income borrowers.86
Merely increasing regulation of government owned businesses
will not sufficiently limit the moral hazard problems attending the
government’s guarantee.87 As Federal Reserve chairman Alan
Greenspan observed at the time, increased regulation of an implicitly
governmentally guaranteed enterprise only enhances the market’s
perception that the government is all the more willing to guarantee
its debt.88 Indeed, prior to the revelations of accounting irregularities
at the two GSEs, its dedicated regulator performed the sort of
inspections and audits typical of a financial regulator without
uncovering any problems, particularly at Freddie Mac.89
In order to deal with these challenges, this Article will now
examine a new solution suggesting the use of government financial
statements and a method of determining the statutory debt ceiling to
counter the government’s incentives to use its investment in private
83. Wallison, Moral Hazards, supra note 43, at 2.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 2. See also Amity Shlaes, Fannie Mae’s Demise Rooted in the Swinging ‘60s,
BLOOMBERG.COM (Sept. 10, 2008, 12:01 AM) http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&refer=columnist_shlaes&sid=ab3S57i4MOtw.
86. Wallison, Moral Hazards, supra note 43, at 3. See also Charles W. Calomiris & Peter
J. Wallison, Blame Fannie Mae and Congress for the Credit Mess, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2008,
at A29.
87. Wallison, Moral Hazards, supra note 43, at 5.
88. Id. at 3.
89. See Wallison, The Evolution of a Policy Idea, supra note 43, at 14.
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companies to facilitate off-balance sheet subsidies. This solution will
seek to achieve three goals: 1) limit the government’s incentive to
bail out troubled firms, particularly by methods that involve taking a
controlling equity position; 2) give the government an incentive to
close out its position in bailed-out entities in which it ends up taking
equity; and 3) present an accurate picture of the value of
government’s holdings and its obligations associated with those
holdings, and how that value affects the government’s overall
financial picture.
IV. INTERNATIONAL BUDGETARY LAW AND ACCOUNTING
APPROACHES TO GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS
There are two international cases that provide useful precedent in
figuring out how to account for the U.S. government’s investment
in TARP recipients regarding the various financial legal and
accounting mechanisms that govern and disclose government
expenditures and financial borrowing. The United Kingdom bailed
out its two largest banks, Royal Bank of Scotland (“RBS”) and
Lloyds, by way of equity injections in much the same manner used
by the United States. Yet, the U.K. accounted for that bailout in a
distinctly different manner from the United States. This Section will
look into the reasons for the U.K.’s approach in comparison to the
current U.S. method of bailout accounting. Additionally, New
Zealand recently undertook a wholly new method to account for its
government owned corporations, and this policy shift will also be
examined. That such closely analogous common law and advanced
economy analogues would account for their bailouts so differently
from the United States calls the current U.S. approach into question.
The U.K. took a 100% interest in Northern Rock, an
approximately 84% interest in RBS, and an approximately 43% equity
interest in Lloyds Banking Group.90 To purchase the RBS shares,
Her Majesty’s (HM) Treasury reports having paid 46 billion
pounds.91 It paid 23 billion pounds for its shares in Lloyds and 20
billion pounds for its ownership of Northern Rock by way of a

90. See NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE, REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR
GENERAL: MAINTAINING FINANCIAL STABILITY ACROSS THE UNITED KINGDOM’S BANKING
SYSTEM, 2009–10, H.C. 91, at 37 (U.K.), available at http://www.nao.org.uk/
idoc.ashx?docId=99ee9a41-99a2-4cbb-b7b1-df61f035e427&version=-1.
91. Id. at 38.
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combination capital injection and loan.92 In November 2009, the
Treasury announced that future capital injections of up to 39 billion
pounds were anticipated for Lloyds and RBS.93
Much like the U.S. approach, the U.K. bank recapitalization
took the form of capital injections in exchange for preferred stock.94
Akin to the approach the Federal Reserve took in managing its
investment in AIG, the U.K. set up the U.K. Financial Investments
Ltd. (“UK FIL”), a quasi-independent company set up to manage
the government’s equity in bailed-out banks.95 Unlike the United
States, however, the U.K. Office of National Statistics (“ONS”)
determined that the UK FIL should be classified as part of the U.K.
government.96 The ONS noted that the public financial sector
corporations on the U.K. balance sheet would now include RBS,
Lloyds, Northern Rock, and Bradford and Bingley.97 It estimated
that the effect on public sector net debt would be an increase of 1.5
trillion pounds.98 This was roughly equivalent to 100% of the U.K.’s
GDP.99
In its decision to classify these four companies as public sector
concerns, the ONS relied on the European System of Accounts 1995
(“ESA95”), part of the body of rules that governs European public
sector accounting.100 That standard requires the U.K. to consolidate
onto the national debt the debt of companies over which it exercises

92. Id.
93. Id. at 5.
94. See MARTIN KELLAWAY, OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, PUBLIC SECTOR
INTERVENTIONS IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 61 (U.K.) (2009), available at http://
www.statistics.gov.uk/articles/nojournal/Financial-crisis.pdf [hereinafter PUBLIC SECTOR
INTERVENTIONS].
95. Id. at 62–63.
96. Id. at 63. The ONS is charged with producing the U.K.’s National Accounts
Estimate, an internationally accepted accounting framework, and the U.K. government as well
as the European Union base their fiscal policy frameworks on the National Accounts. See id. at
4. These estimates are used in the Maastricht Treaty measures to determine Stability and
Growth Pact compliance for eurozone members, and also used to measure Gross National
Income to determine an EU members required contribution to the EU budget. Id. The U.K.
government also bases its fiscal policy objectives on the National Accounts Estimates
promulgated by the ONS. Id.
97. Id. at 1.
98. Id.
99. The U.K.’s GDP in 2010 was 1.47 trillion. See UK Gross Domestic Product GDP
History, UK PUB. SPENDING, http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/uk_gdp_history (last
visited Mar. 26, 2011).
100. See PUBLIC SECTOR INTERVENTIONS, supra note 94, at 5.
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effective control.101 Listed as factors that supported the ONS
determination that Northern Rock should be classified as a public
sector institution as of October 2007 (prior to its full nationalization
in February 2008) were that, according to its agreement with the
Bank of England (“BOE”), it had to obtain permission from the
BOE “before entering into any corporate restructuring, making
substantial changes to the general nature of the business, making
dividend payments, and acquiring or disposing of certain types of
assets.”102 The ONS noted that, as of 2008, the government’s
ownership and right to appoint directors made the classification
question even clearer.103
The ONS determined that RBS and Lloyds, and their subsidiary
companies, should be classified as public sector entities starting
October 2008 based on its judgment that “government has the
ability to control the respective banks’ general corporate policy
through the conditions associated with the agreements signed
relating to recapitalization.”104 Those agreements included provisions
101. ESA95 notes that control is the basis for consolidating private companies into the
public sector, defining control as:
[T]he ability to determine general corporate policy by choosing appropriate
directors, if necessary.
A single institutional unit . . . secures control over a corporation by owning more
than half the voting shares or otherwise controlling more than half the shareholders’
voting power. In addition, government secures control over a corporation as a result
of special legislation decree or regulation which empowers the government to
determine corporate policy or to appoint the directors.
Id. at 6 (quoting Council Regulation, 1996, O.J. 2223/96 (L 310) ¶ 2.26). The ONS also
mentioned that:
ONS National Accounts classification case law uses an assessment of a number of
control indicators to form a judgment on whether there is control. This is a similar
approach to business accounting, which recognizes that companies can be
controlled other than through the majority ownership of voting share capital.
Id. at 7. Accordingly, the ONS states its method for determining whether to consolidate
partially government-owned companies into the public sector balance sheet as follows:
The ONS approach to classification cases involving the public sector is to first
consider whether government, or any other part of the public sector, can exercise
control or influence over an entity’s directors through the appointments process. It
then examines the situation to see whether there are any special factors or
contractual arrangements that enabled any part of the public sector to determine
general corporate policy, either individually or collectively.
Id.
102. Id. at 15.
103. Id. at 16.
104. News Release, Office for National Statistics, Classification of Royal Bank of Scotland
Group plc and Lloyds Banking Group plc (February 19, 2009), available at
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with restrictions on the declaration and payment of dividends or
distributions, director pay, and obligations relating to lending.105
Even when Lloyds redeemed its preference shares from the
government in June 2009 and its dividend restrictions were lifted,
the ONS still maintained its classification as a public sector entity for
these purposes because the other restrictions remained in effect.106
The factors on which the ONS relied in requiring consolidation
of private bank debt into the U.K.’s debt largely mirror the
restrictions included in the preferred shares and capital injection
agreements of TARP recipients in the United States. The ONS did
note, however, that it would not consolidate the operations of RBS
and Lloyds into the public sector current budget.107 This Article will
argue that the United States should follow the U.K.’s lead in
consolidating debt of bailed-out companies into the national debt.
In July of 1989, the New Zealand Parliament passed the Public
Finance Act requiring Royal Departments to consolidate state-owned
enterprises into the government’s financial reporting and budget
process.108 The policy debate in implementing that mandate provides
informative precedent for dealing with the post-bailout holdings of
the Treasury and Federal Reserve, as well as the Government
Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) under federal conservatorship.
In deciding how to account for its investments in governmentowned enterprises, one of the concerns raised in New Zealand was
that consolidation would raise skepticism from the private sector
because of the government’s assertion that it would not guarantee
private firm debt, which would itself perhaps increase interest rates of
sovereign debt.109 If this is true, then attendant private sector
skepticism is a policy goal favored by the analysis in this Article.
Governments tend to give added backing to bailed-out entities, and
consolidation would offer yet another incentive to the government
to avoid bailing out an entity in the first place.
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/crbslbg0209.pdf.
105. Id.
106. See PUBLIC SECTOR INTERVENTIONS, supra note 94, at 78–79.
107. See id. at 72.
108. See Sonja Pont Newby, Consolidation Accounting: A History of the Development of
Financial Reporting Standard FRS-37 and Sector-Neutral Consolidation Accounting for
Crown Financial Reporting by the New Zealand Government 108 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, University of Canterbury), available at http://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/bitstream/10092/
868/1/thesis.fulltext.pdf.
109. Id. at 167.
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Another argument raised against consolidation in the New
Zealand case was that it may give the government further control
over the accounting policies of government companies because the
Treasury could use the argument of the necessity of consistency in
reporting to mandate that the company adopt certain accounting
policies, thus furthering government control over the company.110 In
order to address this concern in the U.S. case, any implementing
legislation would need to affirm that GAAP rulemaking would
remain independent of the Treasury Department.
Still another argument raised against full consolidation was that
the policies put into place by the government to limit its ability to
direct management of state-owned enterprises advocated separating
the two in financial reporting.111 Otherwise, consolidating the two
may provide an inappropriate means of monitoring the relationship
between the government as an investor and the business running
under some measure of independence. These advocates instead
argued for using the equity method to account for the government’s
ownership.112 This was in effect an accuracy of disclosure argument,
and no doubt a similar argument will be raised in the United States
concerning the policies articulated in the Treasury Department’s
white paper on voting equity in TARP recipients.
In determining whether the existence of a trust eliminated a
finding of control, the applicable Australian Accounting Standard
used as precedent by New Zealand found that where a trust is
guided by a fiduciary duty to the trust beneficiary, the beneficiary is
likely in control of the assets held by the trust.113 If the United States
followed a similar approach, it would consolidate its investment in
AIG despite the existence of the AIG Trust because the trust
explicitly defines the Treasury Department as the beneficiary.
Once New Zealand passed its law requiring consolidation, the
final question its Treasury had to consider in deciding how to
account for its substantial Crown (government) investments in
standalone companies was whether to utilize the equity method or
full consolidation.114 New Zealand decided to abandon use of the
110. See id. at 139.
111. Id. at 116.
112. See id. at 117–18.
113. See id. at 177.
114. See id. at 85. See infra Part VI for a summary of the differences between the equity
and full consolidation methods of accounting for ownership in subsidiaries.
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equity method in favor of full consolidation for its government
owned enterprises.115
These two countries demonstrate the unique nature of the U.S.
government’s approach to accounting for its holdings in
government-owned companies. The debt calculation and accounting
systems governing the United States are unique, due in part to its
three-branch governmental system. Yet the U.S. government’s
decision not to consolidate its holdings in any way is without
precedent. And the separation of powers and three-branch system
written into the U.S. Constitution actually provide an even more
forceful argument for consolidation than the U.K. and New Zealand
systems, as the next Section will demonstrate.
V. STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION FOR THE NATIONAL DEBT
CEILING
The Constitution encourages separation of powers in the
borrowing and repayment of money. Article I specifically grants to
Congress the power “to pay the debts . . . of the United States”116
and “to borrow money on the credit of the United States.”117 In
order to facilitate its legislative function of overseeing the debt,
Congress passed the Debt Limit Statute, also known as the debt
ceiling.118 The Debt Limit Statute is Congress’s way of fulfilling
these two required Constitutional functions of overseeing the
borrowing and repayment of the public debt.119 If government
deficit spending requires borrowing above a specified debt limit,
called the debt ceiling, “Congress must enact a law to raise the
ceiling.”120 At present, the government’s debt ceiling statute states
that “[t]he face amount of obligations issued under this chapter and
the face amount of obligations whose principal and interest are
guaranteed by the United States Government . . . may not be more

115. Newby, supra note 108, at 204.
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
118. Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-43, 40 Stat. 288 (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3101 (2000)).
119. Anita S. Krishnakumar, In Defense of the Debt Limit Statute, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
135, 136–37 (2005) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
120. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 105TH CONG., THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS:
AN EXPLANATION 4 (Comm. Print 1998), available at http://budget.senate.gov/
republican/major_documents/budgetprocess.pdf [hereinafter COMMITTEE REPORT].
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than $14,294,000,000,000, outstanding at one time, subject to
changes periodically made in that amount as provided by law
through the congressional budget process.”121 The intent behind the
Debt Limit Statute was to grant the Secretary of the Treasury the
authority to issue debt periodically, up to a specified limit, and
require that the Administration return to Congress periodically to
obtain authorization for additional borrowing.122 Although the list of
items included in the referenced chapter does not currently
enumerate debt issued by companies controlled by the U.S.
government, this Article will argue that it should include the debt
held by such companies.
If the executive branch is allowed to use its controlling stake in
private companies to borrow money for the purposes of subsidies
and policy outcomes which the executive may otherwise need to seek
Congressional approval to achieve, then Congress’s ability to oversee
borrowing and debt repayment is diminished. If, as is the case with
many of the TARP recipients and Fannie and Freddie, those private
companies continue to borrow with the implicit backing of the
United States, then separation of powers with respect to borrowing
and paying debts is entirely sidestepped. One phenomenon which
indicates the implicit backing of banks is the low discounts of private
bank debt in relation to the decreases in their stock price.123
One approach to consolidation would be to net the assets of
TARP firms against their debt, and report the balance. This was not
the approach taken by the U.K.124 One policy reason not to net the
debt against the assets of TARP recipients when consolidating them
into the debt ceiling estimate is that it could leave the government
with an incentive to keep some firms under government control, in
the event that assets exceeded debt at those firms. The Debt Limit
Statute itself does not include a method for consolidating the debt of
the United States against its assets, but instead directly limits the
gross outstanding debt of the United States without any mention of
assets in the statute.125 The fact that very little attention is paid to
assets held by the United States in the Debt Limit Statute is, from a
constitutional perspective, consistent with evidence from the
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
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Krishnakumar, supra note 119, at 136.
See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 2, at 258.
See PUBLIC SECTOR INTERVENTIONS, supra note 94, at 1.
31 U.S.C.A. § 3101 (West 2010).
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Federalist papers demonstrating the Founders’ fixation with paying
off, and minimizing, debt held by the government. Federalist No. 7,
written by Alexander Hamilton, the first Treasury Secretary of the
United States, reveals an important concern underlying the debt
clauses of the Constitution.126
One of the very real consequences of the Debt Limit Statute, and
its requirement that the Treasury obtain periodic approval for
increases in the debt limit, has been that negotiations over legislation
to increase the debt limit have led to compromises that have
spawned significant balanced-budget and budgetary reform
legislation aimed at reducing the size and growth of the national
debt.127 During the 1960s, Congress used votes on increases in the
debt ceiling to push for budgetary reform from the executive
branch.128 Members of Congress felt the sting of the debt ceiling
votes quite acutely, and were subject to harsh criticism during reelection.129 Debt ceiling increases were frequently voted down as a
result of this pressure.130 Pressure was felt so acutely that, for a short
period, the House passed the Gephart Rule, which automatically
126. It states:
The public debt of the Union would be a further cause of collision between the
separate States or confederacies. The apportionment, in the first instance, and the
progressive extinguishment afterward, would be alike productive of ill-humor and
animosity. How would it be possible to agree upon a rule of apportionment
satisfactory to all? There is scarcely any that can be proposed which is entirely free
from real objections. These, as usual, would be exaggerated by the adverse interest
of the parties. There are even dissimilar views among the States as to the general
principle of discharging the public debt.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton) “The citizens of the States interested would
clamour; foreign powers would urge for the satisfaction of their just demands, and the peace of
the States would be hazarded to the double contingency of external invasion and internal
contention.” Id. And later, it urges that the new Constitution, “must embrace a provision . . .
for the payment of the national debts contracted, or that may be contracted; and, in general,
for all those matters which will call for disbursements out of the national treasury.” THE
FEDERALIST NO. 30 (Alexander Hamilton). At the Convention, delegate Sherman urged that
“[t]he national debt & the want of power somewhere to draw forth the National resources, are
the great matters that press.” JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 160 (1966).
127. See Krishnakumar, supra note 119, at 138. (“[A]lthough [the Debt Limit Statute’s]
existence has not stopped the trend towards increased borrowing, it has slowed that trend by
acting as a catalyst for budget-reform and budget-balance measures aimed at reducing national
borrowing.”).
128. Id. at 152.
129. Id. at 153.
130. Id. (citing H.R. 12641, 95th Cong. (1978) (vote to raise debt ceiling to $849
billion which was voted down 167-228)).
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enrolled a bill for submission, without a separate vote by the House,
to the Senate extending the debt ceiling whenever a series of budget
resolutions resulted in a projected increase in the debt sufficient to
violate the existing debt ceiling.131 In 1985, a coalition of Democrats
and Republicans strategically used the required vote on whether to
raise the debt ceiling to pass the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit
Reduction Act, which was a legislative mechanism to cap budget
deficit ceilings for the following five years and thereby reduce deficit
spending.132 In particular, during the period from 1995 to 2002 the
Gephart Rule was waived every year as Congress has embraced votes
on the debt ceiling as an opportunity to push for deficit reduction
and balanced budget legislation.133 The proposed Balanced Budget
Constitutional Amendment from the 1990s would have also used
the national debt ceiling to maintain a new constitutional limit on
spending.134 One such iteration would have required a three-fifths
vote of each house of Congress to approve an increase in the debt
ceiling.135 One of the results of consolidation, depending on the
accounting method chosen, could be to have a balance sheet
eliminating inter-entity balances for the duration of the
consolidation.136 For instance, amounts owed by Citi to the federal
government and Treasury bonds held by Citi would be eliminated
from the government’s budget, financial statements, and debt ceiling
estimate.
Krishnakumar presents both an interest group theory and
decision theory in support of the debt ceiling statute that are even
more applicable in the case of controlled bank debt than in the more
general case she analyzed.137 Krishnakumar builds her analysis on
work by Posner, Arrow, and others which argue that decisions which
we might consider to be built on majoritarian ideas are in fact a
product of interest group coalitions that lead to outcomes which a
majority of the electorate would otherwise vote against if given the

131. Id. at 153.
132. Id. at 154–55.
133. Id. at 156 & n.135.
134. Id. at 156.
135. H.R.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong. (1995).
136. Cf. Newby, supra note 108, at 120 (quoting a joint paper prepared by the OAG, the
British State Services Commission, and the British Treasury suggesting that this was one
possible accounting method for Crown and sub-entity balance sheets).
137. See Krishnakumar, supra note 119, at 160–62.
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opportunity to vote on each individual item.138 Average citizens thus
have their interests diffused, such that they suffer from collective
action constraints in their ability to form coalitions to lobby for or
against legislation. This is contrasted to tightly formed minority
interest groups for whom an investment in lobbying is a wise
investment.139 Krishnakumar in part relies on Arrow’s theorem that
“decisions made by majority vote in Congress are not truly
majoritarian” because they are more a function of the rules
governing presentation, debate, and the voting structure of policy
choices.140 Krishnakumar also notes that party control of the budget
process can lead to logrolling in budget decisions,141 which in turn
can influence decisions about subsidies to individual interest groups
which may override a focus on the overall size of the budget deficit
and the national debt. Krishnakumar also argues that a shift in the
House from committee chairmanships based on seniority to those
based on majority election every session by the majority caucus has
limited the selection of safe-district, senior members who had room
to focus on the national interest rather than maintaining their
chairmanships and their seats.142
The debt ceiling’s requirement that Congress hold a recorded
vote to periodically increase it helps restore the accountability
mechanism that is diminished by the interest group dominance of
the ordinary budget and appropriations process. One of the most
important reasons why the interest groups who should be most
concerned about the size of the national debt are not able to
influence the budget process is because they do not yet exist. Most
of the generations of taxpayers who will eventually pay off the
national debt through taxes are not yet born or old enough to vote.
Even the generation of younger voters who could potentially have an
interest in the future deficit would be overpowered by the more
cogently formed interest groups with a stronger interest in
government subsidies.

138. See id. at 160–62 & nn.158–162.
139. See Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 265–66 (1982).
140. Krishnakumar, supra note 119, at 161 (citing Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey,
The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 903 (1987)).
141. Id. at 161 & n.162 (citing Neal E. Devins, Budget Reform and the Balance of
Powers, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 993, 994, 997 (1990)).
142. Id. at 162.
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Evidence suggests that “yes” votes on increasing the debt ceiling
were used against incumbents in election campaigns in the 1970s
and that, predictably, members of Congress were reluctant to vote in
favor of the debt ceiling; indeed, that concern was the purpose
behind the Gephart Rule, which was passed to provide political cover
on debt limit votes.143 The Gephart Rule was frequently waived after
this period as a result of influence by members of Congress who
themselves were interested in using the disciplinary power of the
debt ceiling vote to keep spending down.144
Krishnakumar observes that the debt ceiling vote actually
functions as an anti-logrolling vote.145 Individual interest groups are
less galvanized to lobby for an increase in the debt ceiling because
the link between their interest and the increased spending is difficult
to distinguish among the thousands of spending compromises that
eventually constitute the budget process and in any event, the link is
usually temporally distant.146 Thus, even if failure to pass an increase
in the debt ceiling will result in a required reduction in expenditures,
interest groups will be unable to determine at the time of that vote
whether that will equate to a reduction in their particular project.147
That uncertainty limits their incentive to lobby the vote. Indeed,
Krishnakumar notes that interest groups may have reason to fear
supporting an overall increase in the debt limit, as it may brand them
negatively.148 Where they could link their spending increase to
supporting their cause, interest group support of runaway debt could
limit their own ability to recruit new members or maintain links with
congressional members that may support special interest funding
projects as an exception to their overall interest voting against
increases in the debt ceiling.149
One of the reasons why a vote on the debt ceiling may be a more
useful accountability mechanism than the accumulated voting record
of a member could relate to work on voter ignorance. Voters have
been shown to have little understanding of complex policy decisions,
and in particular have rational incentives to remain ignorant because
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
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See id. at 166–67.
See id.
Id. at 166.
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of the cost of learning.150 But a decision to raise the debt ceiling is a
simple one, and one that overarches the accumulation of spending
policy decisions that make up the budget process.
Krishnakumar also argues that the debt ceiling vote permits
legislators more time to deliberate over the long-term consequences
of government debt than the rushed budget process affords.151 This
notion would be even more important in the context of bailed-out
companies. When legislators initially considered the TARP bailout,
they were faced with an impending market panic, and indeed many
have asserted that their second vote in favor of the bailout was
influenced by a substantial decline in the Dow Jones Industrial
Average just after their initial vote against it.152 One could expect
future bailouts to be structured similarly to this one, since there will
always be pressure to take equity in bailed-out companies, with the
argument that the taxpayer should be allowed to participate in any
future upside to the bailed-out firm. But after the bailout is
executed—and if future bailouts are structured similarly to the last
one, where the decision of when to divest of equity was left to the
executive branch—the legislative branch will similarly be unable to
reconsider the bailout or force the government to sell off companies
that make for useful subsidy devices. But if, as a consequence of the
bailout, Congress is required to hold a vote on the debt ceiling
earlier than it would otherwise, then Congress gains both the
incentive and the opportunity to push the executive branch to divest
its interest in the bailed-out firm. Further, at that time, Congress
would have an opportunity to deliberate over the wisdom of
continued government ownership without needing to do so in the
midst of a market crisis.
One important aspect of the debt ceiling vote is that it is not
typically used as a vehicle for other legislation, but rather is passed in
clean form.153 For example, from 1978–2002, there were relatively
few debt ceiling votes that included one or more substantial
amendments, and almost all of these rider amendments were directly
related to the national debt, such as balanced budget provisions and
150. See Ilya Somin, Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal, 12 CRITICAL REV. 413
(1998).
151. Krishnakumar, supra note 119, at 167.
152. Greg Hitt & Deborah Solomon, Historic Bailout Passes as Economy Slips Further,
WALL ST. J. , Oct. 4, 2008, at A1.
153. Krishnakumar, supra note 119, at 172.
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the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act; only four of the forty-two debtlimit increase bills had non-debt-related riders attached.154
Critics of the debt ceiling argue that it risks perilous
consequences if the President and Congress are not able to come to
a consensus on the debt ceiling and thus force the United States into
default on its debt obligations.155 Abramowicz argues that the Debt
Limit Statute is dangerous because it creates the threat that Congress
will default on its debts, it thereby gives Congress excess leverage in
negotiations with the President.156 It is precisely this threat of serious
consequences that is required to limit the executive branch’s
temptation to use its interest in TARP recipients for political ends. It
can ultimately give Congress both the incentive and the leverage to
push the Administration to cut spending. Krishnakumar points out,
however, that, in the eighty-six year history of the debt ceiling
preceding the writing of her article, the United States has never
defaulted on its debt.157 But even if that criticism of the debt ceiling
were to hold in the general case, it would be muted in the context of
this paper’s argument, as the President would have an easy
alternative to obtaining congressional approval. He could instead sell
off the private companies controlled by the government, and thereby
reduce the national debt and put off the need to increase the debt
ceiling until the other public debt rose up to that level.
As the national debt nears the debt ceiling, Treasury Secretaries
find themselves in the unenviable position of scurrying to move
funds around in order to temporarily maintain the government’s
finances. One method readily available to the Treasury Secretary is to
manipulate its pension funds for government retirees.158 This,
however, buys the administration only a small window of time. If,
however, the Treasury Secretary had the option of divesting federal
holdings in government controlled private businesses, it would open
a much larger window for Treasury to delay the required vote on the
debt ceiling.159
154. Id. at 172–73.
155. Id. at 175.
156. See Michael Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets, Fourteenth Amendment Style, 33
TULSA L.J. 561, 579 (1997).
157. Krishnakumar, supra note 119, at 175.
158. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-526, DEBT CEILING: ANALYSIS
OF ACTIONS TAKEN DURING THE 2003 DEBT ISSUANCE SUSPENSION PERIOD passim (2004),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04526.pdf.
159. Id.
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In addition, the debt ceiling statute serves as a backstop to the
budget process.. Krishnakumar argues that the 1974 Budget Act,
which allocated budgetary authority from a group of appropriations
subcommittee chairmen to a new central Congressional Budget
Committee, actually resulted in “increased party control and
manipulation of the budget process at the expense of diverse floor
deliberation” as she argues that the fact that a single chairman would
be more susceptible to party control than several subcommittees.160
Another restraint imposed on typical Senate procedure is that rulings
of the presiding officer on points of order relating to budget issues
require a sixty-vote majority to overturn, rather than the simple
majority usually required.161 That filibuster right is also constrained
for specific votes. For example, some of the exceptions to the
filibuster state that budget resolutions and budget reconciliation
amendments, motions to proceed to consideration of those
amendments, and questions of germaneness on appropriations
amendments are all non-debatable.162 The result is that the filibuster
does not operate for consideration of the budget and appropriations
process. This limits the ability of individual senators to challenge
Senate leadership and enforce the unique deliberative process of the
Senate. There is also an important procedural difference between
votes on the budget resolution and votes on increases in the debt
ceiling: the budget resolution cannot be filibustered, but a vote to
authorize an increase in the debt ceiling can be filibustered.163 The
national debt limit vote helps to buttress the procedural protection
of the Senate, which is limited in the annual budget context, and
brings that procedural protection to bear in making the less-frequent
statutory debt ceiling vote an opportunity for long-term
contemplation of the nation’s financial situation. The ability of
senators to extend debate indefinitely, or filibuster, and the corollary
cloture process requiring sixty votes to proceed, are two of the
defining features of the Senate.164 In effect, highly contentious issues
160. Krishnakumar, supra note 119, at 152.
161. See Pub. L. No. 99-177 § 271(b), 99 Stat. 1037, 1094, amended by Pub. L. No.
100-119, tit. II, § 211, 101 Stat. 787 (1987).
162. See MARTIN B. GOLD, SENATE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 68–69 (2008).
163. See id. (listing procedures immune from filibuster).
164. See Douglas Dion, William MacMillan & Charles R. Shipan, A War of Words:
Explaining the Duration of the Filibuster in the U.S. Senate, 1919–1993, at 1 (April 15, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript, University of Iowa), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1019807.
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can require a sixty-vote threshold for approval rather than a mere
majority.
Even more importantly, the prospect of having to add the debt
of bailed-out institutions into the national debt would discourage
the government from bailing out institutions in the first place. This is
because the government would be faced with two difficult votes: an
initial appropriation for the bailout (which would likely be rushed
due to financial panic) and a debt ceiling vote (the timeline for which
would be brought substantially forward). There is a surplus of
literature detailing the economic effects of government bailout on
moral hazard, and the consistent conclusion of this literature is that
governments are hard-pressed to commit to not bailing out
institutions; this leads institutions to take risks that ultimately
pressure governments to later bail them out.165 Including the debt of
bailed-out institutions in the debt ceiling might, however, offer an
element of credible commitment that could limit not only actual
instances of government bailout but also increase the distorting
effects on market behavior that the potential for government bailout
encourages, particularly in the financial services sector.
VI. THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
Another reporting mechanism independent of the budgetary
process is the preparation of the financial statements of the United
States. The Government Management Reform Act of 1994 requires
the preparation and audit of consolidated financial statements for the
federal government.166 The Federal Financial Management
Improvement Act of 1996 “directs [agency] auditors to report on
whether agency financial statements comply . . . with federal
accounting standards.”167 In 1990, the OMB, Treasury Department,
and GAO, three agencies claiming lead responsibility for
promulgating federal financial accounting standards, created the
Federal Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Board
(“FASAB”).168 The FASAB issues a number of pronouncements
165. Cf. Dani Rodrik & Richard Zeckhauser, The Dilemma of Government Responsiveness,
7 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 601 (1988) (detailing general dilemma of government’s
inability to bind itself not to act, and citing multiple sources).
166. ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 297 (3d. ed.
2007).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 293.
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which those agencies, and all agencies of the federal government, are
then expected to follow in implementing particular accounting
policies for their agencies.169 The financial statements of the United
States opted to recognize the securities taken in the GSEs, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, at their investment value.170 They have not
yet been released with respect to the BOEs, but their governing
pronouncements offer a window into their expected position.
With respect to accounting for the nation’s debt and asset
position in the financial statements of the United States, put
together annually by the Department of the Treasury, the governing
pronouncement is FASAB Statement of Federal Financial
Accounting Concepts 2: Entity and Display.171 This Statement helps
define entities that should be included on the federal government’s
financial statements.172 The purpose of that inquiry is to ensure that
the following is true of the reported entities: (1) the federal
government has some control over deployment of resources and
some accountability for the entity’s performance; (2) “the entity’s
scope is such that inclusion would provide a meaningful
representation of operations and financial condition;” and (3) that
there are likely to be users of those statements who would find the
information useful in their own resource allocation decisions and
would use it to hold the government entity accountable.173
FASAB statements are intended to guide the OMB in setting the
government’s rules for financial statement preparation.174 This
guidance is intended to ultimately help hold the government
accountable for its taxing and spending decisions by presenting
accurately the effects of new policies on the budget.175 FASAB
outlines a number of informative criteria for determining whether to
consolidate an entity into the federal government’s books, including
some which hold particular relevance in this context: (1) “whether it
is owned by the federal government”; (2) whether the government
169. See, e.g., Statements of Federal Financial Accounting Concepts and Standards, FED.
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ADVISORY BD. (2008), available at http://www.fasab.gov/
pdffiles/codification_report2008.pdf (representing an example of such pronouncements)
[hereinafter FASAB].
170. See 2008 U.S. DEP’T TREASURY FIN. REP. U.S. GOV’T 62.
171. See FASAB, supra note 169, at 76.
172. See id.
173. Id.
174. See id. at 79.
175. See id. at 80.
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has “the ability to select or remove the governing authority . . .
particularly if there is to be a significant continued relationship with
the governing authority or management with respect to carrying out
important public functions”; (3) whether the government has “the
ability to veto, overrule, or modify governing body decisions or
otherwise significantly influence normal operations”; and (4)
whether and the extent to which the government retains implicit or
“moral responsibility” for the entity’s debt.176
FASAB makes clear that the Federal Reserve System is not
considered part of the “government-wide reporting entity” because
of the Federal Reserve’s operational independence from the
executive branch.177 Even if this is the case, it does not speak for
excluding AIG from consolidation. Though the Federal Reserve
created the trust that serves as custodian of the Federal Reserve’s
investment in AIG, the operating documents of that trust make clear
that the trustees look to the Treasury Department for leadership.178
The fiduciary duty of the trustees is in fact specifically defined as
being to the best interest of the Treasury.179 FASAB makes a curious
decision about accounting for government sponsored enterprises. It
says, with little analysis, that they do not function in a manner
consistent with the indicative criteria.180 Even if this is true in the
general case, that rule was not promulgated at a time in which the
GSE were, as they are now, under federal conservatorship and
subject to an explicit and unlimited guarantee from the Treasury
Department, and given a special accommodation from the Federal
Reserve to agree to buy vast quantities of GSE debt.
It also makes a curious observation about bailout entities. It
notes that
[t]he Federal Government occasionally bails out, i.e. guarantees or
pays debt, for a privately owned entity whose failure could have an
adverse effect on the nation’s economy . . . . As a condition of the
bailout, the Federal Government frequently obtains rights similar

176. See id. at 90–91.
177. Id. at 93.
178. See J.W. Verret, Testimony Before the House Committee Concerning the AIG Trust
Agreement and Implications for Pending Citigroup and Other TARP Trust 2 (George Mason
Univ. Law & Econ., Research Paper Series 09-27, 2009), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1408188.
179. Id.
180. FASAB, supra note 169, at 91–92.
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to the indicative criteria . . . . The existence of these rights does not
make the bailed out entity part of the Federal Government
reporting entity or any of the other reporting entities that are part
of the Federal Government.181

This blanket statement is offered with little analysis of why
ignoring nearly all of the indicative criteria listed in the entity
reporting guidance is logical or consistent with the objectives of
federal financial reporting.182 But even assuming it were consistent,
the federal government’s actual behavior in directing corporate
policy at many bailed-out entities can still provide the extra support
to remain consistent with FASAB and still support consolidation of
the TARP recipients.
With respect to the financial statements of the United States,
consolidation would reshape important items in the financial
statements, including the balance sheet estimates of assets and debt,
the statement of net costs, the statement of operations, the
reconciliation of net operating revenue or cost with the unified
budget surplus or deficit, the comparison of actual budget uses with
projected budget uses, and the statement of changes in cash
balance.183
The existing pronouncements from public sector accounting
principles are a useful beginning, but it is also worthwhile to examine
the private sector’s approach to consolidation as well. Private sector
accounting and public sector accounting are distinctive. Private
sector accounting preceded and informed the development of public
sector methods. Though they have many close analogues, they are
promulgated by different bodies. One of the significant distinctions
of governments is that they have the power to print money and to

181. Id. at 92.
182. Id. By contrast, The United Kingdom 1989 Companies Act offers a clear rule on
consolidation of financial reporting for its private sector analogue to GAAP. Newby, supra
note 108, at 155. The indicative criteria it lists for consolidation of a subsidiary investment,
based on Article I of the EC Seventh Directive, include any of the following: “a majority of
voting rights, control of the membership of the administrative, management, or supervisory
body, [or] the right to exercise dominant influence” defined as “influence exercised to achieve
the operating and financial policies desired by the holder of that influence.” Id. The U.K.
definition does not exclude powers that an owner might hold by, for instance, its concomitant
status as a major creditor or regulator of the entity. Id.
183. See FASAB, supra note 169, at 110; see also Overview of Federal Accounting Concepts
and Standards, FED. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ADVISORY BD., 12–13 (September 30, 1996),
http://www.fasab.gov/pdffiles/con_stan.pdf.
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tax citizens to pay off their debts.184 Yet, with the bailout the
principles behind private and public sector accounting
methodologies are merging in a unique way. The government holds
control over private sector entities, many of which still have publicly
traded equity. Their private sector objectives remain, but have been
meshed with public sector goals as well. As such, this unique
dynamic consideration of using private sector accounting methods
for the federal government’s foray into the private sector may be
consistent with the objectives of federal financial statements and
budget laws.
The private sector takes, in certain circumstances, a whole entity
approach to accounting for a parent entity that has partial but
controlling ownership in another entity. The reasoning behind the
entity approach is to treat entities that are jointly controlled as
one.185 Though some may argue that consolidation of subsidiary
activities onto the books of a controlling investor is a useless exercise,
since investors can perform the consolidations themselves if they
think it presents a more accurate picture of the parent firm.
However, evidence indicates that the issuance of SFAS 94, the
current rule requiring consolidation of majority owned subsidiaries,
resulted in a substantial decrease in market share value for those
firms affected by the accounting rule change.186 This indicates that
consolidation of partly owned but controlled entities altered the
market’s perception of the value of the controlling firm.
Under an initial accounting rule, companies were required to
consolidate firms over which they held a greater than 50% voting
interest.187 In 1971, APB No. 18 was issued, which required

184. See Michael J. Boskin, Concepts and Measures of Federal Deficits and Debt and Their
Impact on Economic Activity 25 (NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2332,
1987), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=303492.
185. Maurice Moonitz, The Entity Approach to Consolidated Statements, 17 ACCT. REV.
236, 237 (1942) (stating that “[t]he central premise is that consolidated statements are
exhibits in conventional accounting form of the status and operations of a group of related
companies—exhibits prepared as though the companies were legally as well as economically
mere administrative subdivisions of one concern. The legal separateness of each unit is
disregarded, the fiction of separate corporate entities ignored. Legal lines of cleavage are
replaced by the more useful but less definite boundaries of economic unity. That consolidated
statements are of primary interest to investors and creditors of the dominant company is a
corollary of our major premise.”).
186. Inder Khurana, Security Market Effects Associated with SFAS No. 94 Concerning
Consolidation Policy, 66 ACCT. REV. 611, 613 (1991).
187. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has been trying to reconcile the
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companies to use the equity method in accounting for companies
over which they held significant influence, defined as ownership of
between 20% and 50% of voting stock.188 “Under the equity method,
an investor company would recognize its proportionate share of the
investee’s GAAP income along with an offsetting increase in the
investment asset, and recognize dividends as a decrease in the
investment asset.”189
The general difference between the equity method and full
consolidation is that a company fully consolidating will appear larger,
with more assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses, whereas a
company using the equity method to recognize its investment in a
subsidiary will have better debt-to-equity ratios and ratios for return
on assets and sales.190 This results in many companies taking a 49%
interest in subsidiaries to avoid full consolidation, dubbed the “49%
solution.”191 In 1987 FASB issued SFAS 94, which modified APB 51
and made clear that a previous exception permitting nonconsolidation if the subsidiary was in a different line of business from
the parent was no longer valid.192 SFAS 94 also stated FASB’s goal of
developing a reporting entity concept which should be based on a
concept of actual control rather than the rough estimate of majority

evolving standards for consolidation into a single codification through its consolidation
project. Private Sector accounting principles (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles or
GAAP) on consolidation begins with Accounting Research Bulletin No. 51, Consolidated
Financial Statements (ARB 51), promulgated in 1959. Al L. Hartgraves & George J. Bentson,
The Evolving Accounting Standards for Special Purpose Entitites and Consolidations, 16 ACCT.
HORIZONS 245, 248 (2002). That initial guidance was subsequently reshaped by Statement on
Financial Accounting Standard 94 (SFAS 94), Consolidation of All Majority-Owned
Subsidiaries in 1987. Also related subsequent rules include SFAS 144, Accounting for the
Impairment or Disposal of Long-Lived Assets in 2001 and FASB Interpretation No. 46
(Revised December 2003), Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities: An Interpretation of
ARB No. 51 (FIN 46(R)). Under ARB 51, consolidated financial statements were necessary if
one of the companies in the group had a direct or indirect controlling financial interest in the
other companies (control being defined as having ownership of a majority voting interest, with
particular emphasis placed on the ownership of more than 50% of the outstanding voting
equity of the company). Id. at 255.
188. Id. at 249.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 250.
191. Id.
192. Dennis R. Beresford, Should the FASB Abandon the Consolidation Project?, J. OF
CORP. ACCT. & FIN., 51, available at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgibin/fulltext/113441390/PDFSTART.
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ownership, indicating that sub-majority control would be sufficient
to require consolidation.193
The equity method displayed the investor’s share of the
investee’s net assets and net income as single and separate items on
the parent’s income statement and balance sheet.194 A firm reports its
investment in an entity as a single line item, like “investment in
subsidiary,” at the cost to initially purchase the investment.195 In
each accounting period the investor’s proportionate share of the
investee’s net income or loss is included as a single line item. Any

193. Hartgraves & Bentson, supra note 187, at 250. In 1999 FASB issued a proposed
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS), Consolidated Financial Statements:
Purpose and Policy: Revision of Exposure Draft issued October 16, 1995. This statement was
part of the FASB’s ongoing consolidation project to reshape its consolidation rules to cover a
broader effective control definition to include sub-majority control effectuated through a lack
of other large shareholders or through contractual provisions giving control to the submajority shareholder. Id. at 255. This Statement requires a reporting entity to consolidate the
financial statements of all entities that it controls, where control is now defined in a much
broader way to encompass methods other than holding a majority of voting shares. The FASB
determined in 1999 that it lacked the board votes to approve a final draft, and so the project is
still ongoing. Paragraph 6 of the exposure draft defines control as relating to two key
characteristics:
a) a parent’s decision-making ability (that is not shared with others) that enables it
to guide the ongoing activities of its subsidiary; and b) a parent’s ability to use that
power to increase the benefits that it derives and limit the losses that it suffers from
the activities of that subsidiary. These characteristics, which are similar to those
included in the control concept adopted by international accounting standards and
already adopted by the European Union and many other foreign countries,
can be based on holding a controlling block of voting equity shares, but they may also result
from other sources of control. Patrick A. Casabona & Alex Ashwal, The Concept of Control in
Consolidated Financial Statements: Convergence of U.S. and International Accounting Rules,
26 REV. OF BUS. 36 (2005). The proposed Statement also provides guidance for applying its
definition of control, which includes the following situations identified in paragraphs 18 and
21 that lead to rebuttable presumptions of control:
i) The entity has a majority voting interest in the election of a corporation’s
governing body or a right to appoint a majority of its members. ii) The entity has a
large minority voting interest in the election of a corporation’s governing body and
no other party has a significant voting interest. iii) The entity has a unilateral ability
to 1) obtain a majority voting interest in the election of a corporation’s governing
body or 2) obtain a right to appoint a majority of the corporation’s governing body
through the present ownership of convertible securities or other rights that are
currently exercisable at the option of the holder and the expected benefit from
converting those securities or exercising that right exceeds its expected cost.
See Federal Accounting Standards Board, Consolidated Financial Statements: Purpose and
Policy, 19–22 (1995).
194. Mark P. Bauman, The Impact and Valuation of Off-Balance-Sheet Activities
Concealed by Equity Method Accounting, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 303 (2003).
195. Id. at 305.
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difference between the initial cost of the investment and the
investor’s subsequent percentage interest of net assets is allocated to
identifiable assets of the investee. The investment account is adjusted
downward if the investee gives the investor dividend payments.
Critics of the equity method assert that it distorts the financial
statements of the investor by, for example, overstating the investor’s
return on assets and other leverage ratios.196
An alternative method is proportionate consolidation, which
consolidates the parent entity’s proportionate share of each
component of net assets and net income into the parent’s books. For
instance, a 40% investor would add 40% of the controlled
subsidiary’s short term debt, accounts receivable, cash, property,
accounts payable, electricity expense, and all other financial
statement components (except for stockholder’s equity and retained
earnings) into each individual line item on the books of the parent
entity.197 Critics of proportionate consolidation assert that it is
inappropriate in the absence of an explicit guarantee from the parent
for the investee’s debts.198
These different methods produce widely different results. Studies
comparing the two methods find that proportionate consolidation is
a better predictor of investor profits than equity method
accounting.199 It is unclear which method would be more
appropriate for government consolidation of BOEs, and it may differ
depending on the entity, but either of them would provide more
information than the current at-cost method. Bauman also
demonstrates empirically that market participants tend to place more
weight on off-balance sheet liabilities than off-balance sheet assets,
thus supporting the idea that consolidation of debt rather than of
assets is the central reason users of financial statements may favor the
proportionate consolidation method.200 Other accounting research
demonstrates that bond risk premiums tend to lack the information
to incorporate implicit guarantees of subsidiary debt.201 Statements
196. Id.
197. Id. at 303.
198. Id. at 305.
199. See Roger C. Graham, Jr., & Craig E. Lefanowicz, Evidence of the Relation Between
Accounting for Equity Investments and Equity Valuation, 11 J. ACCT., AUDITING, & FIN. 587
(1996).
200. See generally Bauman, supra note 194.
201. See Ronald L. Stolzfus & Ruth W. Epps, An Empirical Study of the Value-Relevance
of Using Proportionate Consolidation Accounting for Investments in Joint Ventures, 29 ACCT.
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from the Treasury Department during the bank stress tests of 2009
indicate the Treasury’s willingness to guarantee the debt of TARP
recipients if they are unable to meet capital demanded by the
Treasury from market offerings, and as such, this finding would
support the utility of consolidation for both taxpayers and
bondholders as users of government financial statements and
accounting projections.202 But even if bondholders can put together
the necessary information on their own, at the very least it could be
useful to consider retooling government provided information to
accurately reflect the government’s liabilities to reduce bondholder
information costs. Further, literature on voter ignorance shows that
voters rationally do not take the time to educate themselves about
policy decisions. But the growth in the national debt or deficit is a
fairly simple concept by comparison.
Newby asserts one argument against consolidation of
government owned enterprises: accounting consolidation, and the
accompanying statutory authorizations to require government
owned companies to give information to the government in order to
facilitate the government’s obtaining information to fulfill its
accounting statement requirements actually gives the government
more control over the government owned company. Newby argues
that accounting policy actually creates the reality rather than the
other way around.203 It seems clear however that whatever minor
influence the government might gain would be dwarfed by the
influence it possesses, as discussed in the analysis in Section II of this
Article. Further, the independence of GAAP promulgated by the
private sector could easily be maintained.204

FORUM 169 (2005).
202. There is some evidence to indicate that private markets already assume that the
government stands fully behind the debt of TARP companies, as the price of bonds for
companies like Citigroup have maintained most of the value through the financial crisis. See,
e.g., Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 2.
203. Newby, supra note 108, at 213.
204. One issue that might be raised with respect to government consolidation of private
sector financial statements would be the timing disparity between the financial years for private
entities versus the budget cycle and financial statement year for the federal government, which
would involve reporting years that ended on different dates. As such, if for example the private
sector entity had to give information to the government prior to its issuance of an annual
report, including that information in a report issued by the government might leak information
to the public and to competitors in advance of the timing required under the existing SEC
reporting requirements. Or, if a convention were adopted that government financial estimates
consolidated items from the most recently issued financial statements of the private entities, it

438

DO NOT DELETE

391

5/3/2011 12:45 PM

Separation of Bank and State
A. Economists as Users of Financial Statements

There are a number of users of government financial statements,
including purchasers of government bonds, who seek to price the
riskiness and returns of their investments. Examples of such members
include: members of Congress who are exercising their constitutional
oversight duties, taxpayers seeking to hold elected officials
accountable, and economists who make predictions about the future
of the economy.205
Economists as early as Adam Smith argued that government
labor was less productive than private labor.206 One articulation is
that if the government were to borrow money from banks to finance
its investment spending, the government’s increased purchasing
power would drive up the price of the goods it purchased, deterring
private investment.207 In the present context, the government would
not need to borrow from banks, but could actually direct fiscal policy
actions through its control over the corporate policies of the banks
themselves.
Keynes himself even notes that “[w]ith the confused psychology
which often prevails, the Government programme may, through its
effect on ‘confidence,’ increase liquidity-preference or diminish the
marginal efficiency of capital, which, again, may retard other
investment unless measures are taken to offset it.”208 What Keynes
did not consider, and what may even enhance this effect, is that the
business psychology of the financial services industry could change
substantially when the government becomes a controlling owner of a
bank or of a bank’s competitor.
One policy argument which favors making sure that the
government’s deficit and debt are both properly estimated, and
demonstrate the government’s influence over the productive assets
could be the case that the government reports would be inaccurate by a large margin.
Consolidation would also require that the government adopt policies with respect to the
consolidation of transactions that are estimated using different conventions in the private
sector than in the public sector.
205. Newby, supra note 108, at 190.
206. See Roger W. Spencer & William P. Yohe, The “Crowding Out” of Private
Expenditures by Fiscal Policy Actions, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS 12, 15 (Oct.
1970).
207. Id.
208. Spencer & Yohe, supra note 206, at 17 (citing JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE
GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 120 (Harcourt Brace and
Company, 1936)).
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of the national economy, is that it will present a more accurate input
to determine the crowding out effect of government spending. The
crowding out effect holds that public debt crowds out private saving
and ultimately diminishes capital formation.209 The budget deficit or
surplus is an estimate of the difference between federal expenditures
and federal receipts for a certain year, and it reflects the amount the
government will need to borrow to finance that deficit.210 Amounts
the government must borrow are not available for private
investment, resulting in consequences for future interest rates,
inflation, and the long run performance of the economy.211 Barro
offers an alternative view, the notion of Ricardian equivalence,
whereby increases in public debt result in an increased demand for
public debt, effectively arguing that the private sector can undo the
government’s redistribution of resources across generations.212
The Ricardian equivalence conjecture rests on a number of
unlikely assumptions, including that taxation is non-distortionary
and that the private and public sectors use the same discount rate.213
Thus crowding out would seem to be an important effect of
government spending, with its precise magnitude remaining an open
question. The inflationary effects of government spending have also
been argued.214 Many studies of government deficits focus on
nominally reported amounts, although a few economists have argued
for adjustments. Feldstein argues in favor of adjusting for the
unfunded liabilities of Social Security.215 Boskin argues for including
the effect of government lending and guarantees.216
The effect of government spending on private investment is hotly
debated.217 One group of economists demonstrate that if all
209. Boskin, supra note 184, at 13.
210. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 120, at 4.
211. Id.
212. See Boskin, supra note 184, at 14; see also James R. Barth, George Iden, & Frank S.
Russek, Do Federal Deficits Really Matter?, 3 CONTEMP POL’Y ISSUES 79 (Fall 1984).
213. Boskin, supra note 184.
214. See id. at 6.
215. Martin S. Feldstein, Social Security, Induced Retirement and Aggregate Capital
Accumulation, 82 J. POL. & ECON. 905 (1974).
216. Michael D. Hurd & Michael J. Boskin, The Effect of Social Security on Retirement in
the Early 1970s, 99 Q. J. ECON. 767 (1984).
217. Costas Azariadis & Pietro Reichlin, Increasing Returns and Crowding Out, 20 J.
ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 847 (1995); Peter A. Diamond, National Debt in a
Neoclassical Growth Model, 55 AM. ECON. REV. 1126 (1965); Franco Modigliani, Long-Run
Implications of Alternative Fiscal Policies and the Burden of National Debt, 71 ECON. J. 730
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government debt were eliminated in OECD countries, real interest
rates would fall by 163 basis points, and potentially more depending
on assumptions about the number of consumers that are liquidity
constrained.218 They include an assumption of a positive birth rate
which tends to reduce any element of Ricardian equivalence in
crowding-out models.219 They also conclude that the roughly 20%
increase in debt/GDP ratio of large OECD countries over the
period from 1975–1996 resulted in a loss of roughly 2.9% in annual
GDP growth. The growth in the government’s debt/GDP ratio over
the last five years would seem to indicate much greater fallout. A
proper accounting for the Treasury Department’s investment in
TARP recipients, however, would dramatically increase a proper
estimate of that cost to GDP growth. The debt and deficit are not
merely the focus of academic studies, professional economic
forecasters at banks, and trade groups. The Federal Open Market
Committee of the Federal Reserve Board also uses these inputs to
guide investment and policy decisions for thousands of member
banks, clients, and investment professionals.
Some economists argue that fiscal policy actions or increased
government spending financed by government borrowing and
designed to stimulate economic growth fail to accomplish their
objective. This failure can be explained by the fact that additional
government borrowing crowds out of the market an equal, or even
greater, volume of borrowing that would have financed private
investment.220 Crowding out is offered as an argument against the so
called Keynesian multiplier, which is an assumption that government
spending leads to positive changes in aggregate demand through
shifts of the IS curve.221 Other economists have urged that if

(1961); Gilles Saint-Paul, Fiscal Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model, 107 Q. J. ECON. 1243
(1992); J.E. Meade, Is the National Debt a Burden?, 10 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 163 (1958).
218. Hamid Faruqee, Douglas Laxton, & Steve Symansky, Government Debt, Life-Cycle
Income and Liquidity Constraints: Beyond Approximate Ricardian Equivalence (Int’l Monetary
Fund Working Paper, 1996) (assuming that 20% of consumers are young and thus more likely
to be liquidity constrained. The pending crisis in entitlements indicates that older baby
boomers may also face similar liquidity constraints, thus indicating that their estimate may
reflect the low end of the spectrum.).
219. Id. at 22.
220. See Spencer & Yohe, supra note 206, at 13.
221. Id. at 13.

441

DO NOT DELETE

5/3/2011 12:45 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2011

crowding out does in fact occur, it is less likely when the economy is
operating at substantially less than full employment.222
Regardless of the outcome of the crowding-out debate, the
public/private distinction has become a clear point of delineation for
that debate and for the inputs around which the models in that
debate are crafted. As such, a convention to account for the
government’s investment in private enterprise requires careful
consideration and more depth than the government’s self-serving
interest in keeping liabilities and subsidies off-budget and
unconstrained from Congressional review.
VII. CONCLUSION
Much of the existing literature on bailouts focuses on the moral
hazard problems created by the prospect of bailout. The debates in
that arena concern whether governments should bail out companies
and how the financial regulators should determine whether bailout is
appropriate. A few other writers in this area have recently worked on
the issue of bailout design, trying to determine a method to backstop
the private markets in a way that harnesses private market solutions
through auctions and other procedures. But surprisingly little
attention has been paid to the laws governing the national debt and
financial statements. There has also been surprisingly little focus on
how to get governments to internalize the effects of their actions in
exercising control over companies. This Article offers an initial look
into both unexplored areas.
Financial accounting is intended to guide users of financial
statements in their interactions with the entity under review by
giving them an accurate picture of historical operations. The existing
legal and accounting approach to recognizing bailed-out entities
evade these important functions. By its control over private sector
companies, the executive branch has the ability to facilitate transfers
and subsidies off-budget through its control over bailout recipients.
As such, a failure to consolidate the operations of bailout recipients
hides a significant level of economic activity over which the
government has control and financial responsibility. The private
sector has developed accounting procedures to deal with this
problem in its consolidation rules. The public sector accounting rules
also have a consolidation provision, but the regulators have opted to
222. Id. at 24.
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carve out an exception with little justification for bailed-out entities.
However, a consolidation mechanism for government control over
bailed-out entities is essential to maintain the transparency objective
of government financial statements.
The national debt ceiling functions as a powerful limit on
congressional spending. It fulfills a vital Constitutional function of
providing the legislature with a means to fulfill its ability to check the
executive branch’s discretion in spending. But the legislature has
unwittingly ceded much of its spending and debt oversight powers
and responsibilities through the bailout. Not only does the bailout
operate as a revolving appropriation, but it gives the government
authority to sidestep formal appropriations in favor of off balance
sheet transfers. In order to realign the executive branch’s incentives
to minimize their likelihood of abusing this discretion, the debt of
bailed-out entities should also be included in the debt ceiling
calculation. That way, the legislature’s participation in the process is
restored and both branches have a realigned set of incentives with
respect to bailed-out entities. They will face budgetary pressure to
privatize bailed-out entities held, and also reconsider the need to
bailout firms in the first place.
To the extent that there has been some limited debate about
consolidation of off-balance sheet entities, this debate has typically
focused on the Social Security Trust or the government sponsored
entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The former is a distinct issue,
and the latter is only the beginning of the problem. Before the
financial crisis began, government regulators frequently commented
that they would not bail out risky financial institutions, in the hopes
that market distortions based on that assumption could be limited.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s regulator also made clear that the
GSEs were private sector companies that weren’t the beneficiaries of
unlimited government backing. Fannie and Freddie’s executives
asserted that their private sector goals of profit maximization were
consistent with their goals of subsidizing the mortgage market. All
three of those pronouncements lack as much credibility now as they
did when they were made. The best way to limit the distorting
effects of government control over private firms is to recognize the
costs of government control within the mechanisms that control and
report on the government’s finances by consolidation of bailed-out
entities.
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